1
00:01:18,639 --> 00:01:21,139
♫ cold feet and a tie

2
00:01:21,141 --> 00:01:23,476
♫ rise to the occasion

3
00:01:23,478 --> 00:01:26,345
♫ a million tiny flashlights

4
00:01:26,347 --> 00:01:28,614
♫ I gotta turn it off

5
00:01:28,616 --> 00:01:29,781
♫ cold feet and a tie

6
00:01:29,783 --> 00:01:33,619
♫ rise to the occasion

7
00:01:33,621 --> 00:01:36,155
♫ a million tiny flashlights

8
00:01:36,157 --> 00:01:38,558
♫ I gotta turn it off

9
00:01:38,560 --> 00:01:41,194
♫ for a while

10
00:01:41,196 --> 00:01:45,965
♫ I'll keep my place ¶

11
00:01:48,401 --> 00:01:51,170
♫ but tonight

12
00:01:51,172 --> 00:01:55,641
♫ I'll stay so late ¶

13
00:01:59,479 --> 00:02:02,548
♫ oh sleep for a while

14
00:02:02,550 --> 00:02:04,683
♫ too much conversation

15
00:02:04,685 --> 00:02:07,185
♫ too much information

16
00:02:07,187 --> 00:02:09,622
♫ I gotta turn it off

17
00:02:09,624 --> 00:02:12,358
♫ oh sleep for a while

18
00:02:12,360 --> 00:02:15,094
♫ too much conversation

19
00:02:15,096 --> 00:02:17,396
♫ too much information

20
00:02:17,398 --> 00:02:19,632
♫ I gotta turn it off

21
00:02:19,634 --> 00:02:22,301
♫ for a while

22
00:02:22,303 --> 00:02:27,039
♫ I'll keep my place ¶

23
00:02:29,709 --> 00:02:32,611
♫ and tonight

24
00:02:32,613 --> 00:02:37,383
♫ I'll stay so late ¶

25
00:02:39,620 --> 00:02:42,822
♫ and here we are

26
00:02:57,236 --> 00:03:00,006
♫ gotta turn it off

27
00:03:07,614 --> 00:03:09,982
♫ gotta turn it off

28
00:03:18,024 --> 00:03:20,026
♫ gotta turn it--

29
00:03:27,034 --> 00:03:29,168
[narrator] just about
every time we use the internet,

30
00:03:29,170 --> 00:03:30,970
A communication link,
or an app,

31
00:03:30,972 --> 00:03:34,373
We agree to some very long
terms and conditions.

32
00:03:34,375 --> 00:03:37,242
But what exactly
are we agreeing to?

33
00:03:37,244 --> 00:03:39,244
You guys!
You gotta help me.

34
00:03:39,246 --> 00:03:40,946
These business-casual g-men
are trying to kidnap me!

35
00:03:40,948 --> 00:03:43,181
What?
It's crazy, dude!

36
00:03:43,183 --> 00:03:46,118
They're saying it's
because I agreed to the latest
terms and conditions on itunes!

37
00:03:46,120 --> 00:03:49,121
Why? What did the
terms and conditions
for the last update say?

38
00:03:49,123 --> 00:03:51,256
I don't know!
I didn't read them!

39
00:03:51,258 --> 00:03:53,158
You didn't read them?

40
00:03:53,160 --> 00:03:55,561
Who the hell reads
that entire thing
every time it pops up?

41
00:03:55,563 --> 00:03:56,929
I do.

42
00:03:56,931 --> 00:03:58,731
Can you tell--

43
00:03:58,733 --> 00:04:02,535
Can apple tell how many
people actually read it?

44
00:04:05,038 --> 00:04:08,273
Well, they have to say
that they agree.

45
00:04:08,275 --> 00:04:11,777
We can't know for sure
if they've read--

46
00:04:11,779 --> 00:04:14,680
We try to make it in plain
english and very short.

47
00:04:14,682 --> 00:04:18,584
If I were trying to make
a user agreement uninviting,

48
00:04:18,586 --> 00:04:20,986
I would choose a small font,

49
00:04:20,988 --> 00:04:23,889
A sans serif font, and
I would set it in all caps.

50
00:04:23,891 --> 00:04:25,390
Because what happens then
is that you have type

51
00:04:25,392 --> 00:04:29,394
That becomes a texture
rather than words and spaces.

52
00:04:29,396 --> 00:04:32,932
No one has read
the terms and conditions,

53
00:04:32,934 --> 00:04:34,767
No one in the world.

54
00:04:34,769 --> 00:04:37,269
No one. Even the lawyers who
wrote it wrote it like this.

55
00:04:37,271 --> 00:04:39,171
[laughter]

56
00:04:39,173 --> 00:04:41,340
You come to a website
and they have a set of rules

57
00:04:41,342 --> 00:04:42,441
Usually described in
a terms of services,

58
00:04:42,443 --> 00:04:43,943
And then they have
a privacy policy.

59
00:04:43,945 --> 00:04:46,145
And as soon as you
start using the service,

60
00:04:46,147 --> 00:04:49,448
In essence, you have agreed
to the terms of service
and the privacy policy.

61
00:04:49,450 --> 00:04:53,151
Do these terms and conditions
that we sign up for even apply?

62
00:04:53,153 --> 00:04:56,422
They do. I think
if they didn't apply,

63
00:04:56,424 --> 00:04:58,157
I think the web
would topple over.

64
00:04:58,159 --> 00:05:00,559
And so, to the extent there
have been contract decisions,

65
00:05:00,561 --> 00:05:03,629
They've held that these terms
and conditions are valid.

66
00:05:03,631 --> 00:05:06,499
[narrator] and this concept
is pretty new.

67
00:05:06,501 --> 00:05:09,001
For instance, you never
had to sign a user agreement

68
00:05:09,003 --> 00:05:10,369
For an old-fashioned
land line,

69
00:05:10,371 --> 00:05:13,239
Or to watch tv,
or to read a book.

70
00:05:13,241 --> 00:05:15,373
But if you use
a smart phone, a kindle,

71
00:05:15,375 --> 00:05:18,711
Or you watch hulu,
then you do.

72
00:05:18,713 --> 00:05:19,745
Violet baby,
don't you sign
anything there!

73
00:05:19,747 --> 00:05:21,580
What's this
all about?

74
00:05:21,582 --> 00:05:23,215
Standard form
of contract.

75
00:05:23,217 --> 00:05:24,983
Don't talk to me
about contracts, wonka.

76
00:05:24,985 --> 00:05:27,018
I use them myself.
They're strictly
for suckers.

77
00:05:27,020 --> 00:05:29,588
Yes, but you wouldn't
begrudge me a little
protection.

78
00:05:29,590 --> 00:05:33,142
[narrator] in fact, if you
were to read everything
you agreed to,

79
00:05:33,144 --> 00:05:36,161
It would take one full month
of work out of every year.

80
00:05:36,163 --> 00:05:41,100
That's 180 hours you'd need
to spend every year.

81
00:05:41,102 --> 00:05:43,368
And according to
"the wall street journal,"

82
00:05:43,370 --> 00:05:45,971
Consumers lose $250 billion

83
00:05:45,973 --> 00:05:48,941
Each year due to what's
hidden in fine print.

84
00:05:48,943 --> 00:05:51,944
Here's an example
from linkedin's terms.

85
00:05:51,946 --> 00:05:54,013
You grant linkedin
a nonexclusive,

86
00:05:54,015 --> 00:05:57,049
Irrevocable, worldwide,
perpetual, unlimited,

87
00:05:57,051 --> 00:05:59,151
Assignable, sublicenseable,
fully paid-up

88
00:05:59,153 --> 00:06:00,653
And royalty-free right
to us to copy,

89
00:06:00,655 --> 00:06:02,021
Prepare derivative works of,
improve, distribute, publish,

90
00:06:02,023 --> 00:06:03,322
Remove, retain, add, process,
analyze, use and commercialize,

91
00:06:03,324 --> 00:06:04,623
In any way now known or
in the future discovered,

92
00:06:04,625 --> 00:06:06,192
Any information you provide,
directly or indirectly

93
00:06:06,194 --> 00:06:07,526
To linkedin, including, but not
limited to, any user-generated
content,

94
00:06:07,528 --> 00:06:08,861
Ideas, concepts, techniques
or data to the services,

95
00:06:08,863 --> 00:06:10,162
You submit to linked in,
without any further consent,

96
00:06:10,164 --> 00:06:11,997
Notice and/or compensation
to you or to any third parties.

97
00:06:11,999 --> 00:06:14,767
[narrator] so linkedin takes
pretty much everything forever.

98
00:06:14,769 --> 00:06:17,870
You'll find this kind
of language in google,
pinterest, facebook--

99
00:06:17,872 --> 00:06:21,340
Pretty much anything
that people consider free.

100
00:06:21,342 --> 00:06:23,642
Instagram is finding
that pictures are worth

101
00:06:23,644 --> 00:06:25,644
Much more than
a thousand angry words,

102
00:06:25,646 --> 00:06:29,215
After the company updated
its user agreement to say

103
00:06:29,217 --> 00:06:32,451
It would have the right
to sell posted photos

104
00:06:32,453 --> 00:06:35,587
Without compensation
for use in advertising.

105
00:06:35,589 --> 00:06:37,256
[narrator]
and even if you are paying,

106
00:06:37,258 --> 00:06:38,657
Companies have the ability

107
00:06:38,659 --> 00:06:41,527
To make you accept
just about whatever they please.

108
00:06:41,529 --> 00:06:43,595
In 2009, gestation,

109
00:06:43,597 --> 00:06:45,197
Company in the u.K.,

110
00:06:45,199 --> 00:06:47,766
Put some pretty sneaky
stuff  their terms.

111
00:06:47,768 --> 00:06:50,702
They didn't take mon,
or your firstborn child.

112
00:06:50,704 --> 00:06:52,605
But for one day,
their terms stated:

113
00:06:52,607 --> 00:06:54,406
By pcing an order
via th website,

114
00:06:54,408 --> 00:06:57,710
You agree to grant us
a non-transferable
option to claim,

115
00:06:57,712 --> 00:07:01,313
Now and forer more,
your immortal soul.

116
00:07:01,315 --> 00:07:03,082
The contract was
only live for a day,

117
00:07:03,084 --> 00:07:07,853
But gamestation happened
to rake in the lives of
7,000 immortal souls.

118
00:07:07,855 --> 00:07:11,357
This was of course a joke.
However, it makes you wonder.

119
00:07:11,359 --> 00:07:13,391
What if there were
more serious consequences

120
00:07:13,393 --> 00:07:16,295
That might result from not
reading terms and conditions?

121
00:07:16,297 --> 00:07:18,463
What if your phone came with
these long terms and conditions

122
00:07:18,465 --> 00:07:20,599
That said, well, if you use
the phone the government can
wiretap you.

123
00:07:20,601 --> 00:07:22,067
That would be insane.

124
00:07:22,069 --> 00:07:23,969
But that's the kind of
world we're living in.

125
00:07:23,971 --> 00:07:26,205
[narrator] a world where
the government can wiretap you

126
00:07:26,207 --> 00:07:28,407
Because of terms
and conditions?

127
00:07:28,409 --> 00:07:31,544
So if you look at
the iphone user agreement,

128
00:07:31,546 --> 00:07:33,746
Wiretapping isn't mentioned.

129
00:07:33,748 --> 00:07:36,081
But in at&t's privacy policy,

130
00:07:36,083 --> 00:07:38,918
They say that they can use
data to investigate, prevent,

131
00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:41,587
Or take action regarding
illegal activities.

132
00:07:41,589 --> 00:07:44,223
Prevent?

133
00:07:54,401 --> 00:07:57,970
♫ you'll love the stuff
we're made of, pizza hut! ¶

134
00:07:57,972 --> 00:07:59,138
[narrator] in 1994,

135
00:07:59,140 --> 00:08:01,140
Pizza hut became
the first major chain

136
00:08:01,142 --> 00:08:03,675
To accept a delivery online.

137
00:08:03,677 --> 00:08:06,011
Suddenly the internet needed
a way to remember who you were,

138
00:08:06,013 --> 00:08:08,213
Where you lived, and how
you were going to pay.

139
00:08:10,783 --> 00:08:12,384
My question is,
what the hell?

140
00:08:12,386 --> 00:08:13,452
Like, how do they
know who you are?

141
00:08:13,454 --> 00:08:14,520
Yeah.

142
00:08:14,522 --> 00:08:18,290
Okay, there are
these things called cookies,

143
00:08:18,292 --> 00:08:20,659
Where, like, if you go
to a site and buy something,

144
00:08:20,661 --> 00:08:23,562
It will remember you
and then create ads
for other stuff

145
00:08:23,564 --> 00:08:24,663
You might want to buy.

146
00:08:24,665 --> 00:08:27,866
So it learns
information about me.

147
00:08:27,868 --> 00:08:29,969
Seems like an
invasion of privacy.

148
00:08:29,971 --> 00:08:32,137
[narrator] it wasn't
until the late '90s

149
00:08:32,139 --> 00:08:35,074
That companies began
voluntarily adding
privacy policies

150
00:08:35,076 --> 00:08:37,476
To explain what was happening
with this data.

151
00:08:37,478 --> 00:08:42,081
Then, in 2000, an online company
called toysmart went bankrupt.

152
00:08:42,083 --> 00:08:44,016
But they had an idea.

153
00:08:44,018 --> 00:08:45,417
They tried to sell
their database

154
00:08:45,419 --> 00:08:48,420
Of 195,000 users
to another company.

155
00:08:48,422 --> 00:08:50,989
This included names,
billing information,

156
00:08:50,991 --> 00:08:53,491
Shopping preferences,
and family profiles,

157
00:08:53,493 --> 00:08:57,062
Even though their privacy policy
said they would never share
information.

158
00:08:57,064 --> 00:08:59,331
People felt like
they were being duped.

159
00:08:59,333 --> 00:09:01,400
[man] lawmakers tell you
time and time again

160
00:09:01,402 --> 00:09:03,569
That every time they
go back to their district,

161
00:09:03,571 --> 00:09:06,572
People are telling them
that they want

162
00:09:06,574 --> 00:09:10,342
Some internet privacy laws.
They want some protection.

163
00:09:10,344 --> 00:09:12,077
[narrator] in early 2001,

164
00:09:12,079 --> 00:09:14,079
Over a dozen bills were
introduced in congress

165
00:09:14,081 --> 00:09:15,981
To protect privacy online.

166
00:09:18,752 --> 00:09:20,218
[george w. Bush]
these acts of mass murder

167
00:09:20,220 --> 00:09:22,988
Were intended to frighten our
nation into chaos and retreat.

168
00:09:22,990 --> 00:09:26,358
But they have failed.

169
00:09:26,360 --> 00:09:29,395
[narrator] all of
the privacy legislation
was killed or abandoned,

170
00:09:29,397 --> 00:09:31,997
And the patriot act
was of course initiated.

171
00:09:31,999 --> 00:09:34,667
[bush] the bill before me
takes account of the new
realities and dangers

172
00:09:34,669 --> 00:09:37,102
Posed by modern terrorists.

173
00:09:37,104 --> 00:09:38,904
This new law
that I signed today

174
00:09:38,906 --> 00:09:43,509
Will allow surveillance
of all communications
used by terrorists,

175
00:09:43,511 --> 00:09:48,013
Including e-mails,
the internet, and cell phones.

176
00:09:48,015 --> 00:09:52,685
The patriot act expanded
the ability of the federal
government

177
00:09:52,687 --> 00:09:55,420
To do surveillance in
a lot of little ways.

178
00:09:55,422 --> 00:09:58,023
You don't need a judge's
approval, for instance,

179
00:09:58,025 --> 00:10:01,694
To find out what website
someone visited,

180
00:10:01,696 --> 00:10:04,196
What search terms
they typed into google.

181
00:10:04,198 --> 00:10:09,234
The question of your,
if you will, information,
being retained by google

182
00:10:09,236 --> 00:10:11,704
Is not really at this point
a google decision.

183
00:10:11,706 --> 00:10:14,106
It's really a political
or public-policy decision

184
00:10:14,108 --> 00:10:16,608
Enforced by different
governments in different ways.

185
00:10:16,610 --> 00:10:20,112
[narrator] what if privacy
policies weren't about
protecting privacy at all,

186
00:10:20,114 --> 00:10:22,548
But rather, taking it away?

187
00:10:23,783 --> 00:10:26,551
Let'e's
privacy policy around this time

188
00:10:26,553 --> 00:10:29,087
To see if any changes were made.

189
00:10:29,089 --> 00:10:32,491
So here's google's privacy
policy from December of 2000.

190
00:10:32,493 --> 00:10:34,660
"google may also choose
to use cookies

191
00:10:34,662 --> 00:10:36,061
To store user preferences.

192
00:10:36,063 --> 00:10:39,397
A cookie can tell us,
'this is the same computer

193
00:10:39,399 --> 00:10:40,899
That visited google
two days ago',

194
00:10:40,901 --> 00:10:43,368
But it cannot tell us,
'this person is joe smith',

195
00:10:43,370 --> 00:10:46,472
Or even, 'this person lives
in the United States'.

196
00:10:46,474 --> 00:10:49,408
And here's the privacy policy
from one year later,

197
00:10:49,410 --> 00:10:51,577
In December of 2001.

198
00:10:51,579 --> 00:10:54,313
"google does this by storing
user preferences in cookies

199
00:10:54,315 --> 00:10:57,316
And by tracking user trends and
patterns of how people search.

200
00:10:57,318 --> 00:10:59,918
Google will not disclose cookies
to third parties,

201
00:10:59,920 --> 00:11:03,055
Except as required
by a valid legal process,

202
00:11:03,057 --> 00:11:06,892
Such as a search warrant,
subpoena, statute, or court
order."

203
00:11:06,894 --> 00:11:09,161
Now it's important to note
the fundamental difference

204
00:11:09,163 --> 00:11:10,896
Between these two policies.

205
00:11:10,898 --> 00:11:12,898
One says that you're
totally anonymous.

206
00:11:12,900 --> 00:11:17,002
The other says, when
necessary, you're not.

207
00:11:17,004 --> 00:11:18,570
But here's what's strange.

208
00:11:18,572 --> 00:11:21,240
So the first screenshot you saw
of google's oldest policy

209
00:11:21,242 --> 00:11:24,009
Was taken by a non-profit
internet archival service.

210
00:11:24,011 --> 00:11:26,178
It records what websites
used to look like

211
00:11:26,180 --> 00:11:29,447
By taking snapshots, and it's
been doing it since the '90s.

212
00:11:29,449 --> 00:11:32,618
Now, google also lists the
history of its privacy policies

213
00:11:32,620 --> 00:11:34,920
On its own official archive
page.

214
00:11:34,922 --> 00:11:37,722
In their archives, they state
that they've got every privacy
policy

215
00:11:37,724 --> 00:11:39,291
That goes back to the beginning.

216
00:11:39,293 --> 00:11:41,994
But what google shows as their
original privacy policy

217
00:11:41,996 --> 00:11:44,229
Doesn't match that
of the archive service.

218
00:11:44,231 --> 00:11:47,833
Instead, they show the policy
from December of 2001,

219
00:11:47,835 --> 00:11:50,635
The one that says users
are not anonymous.

220
00:11:50,637 --> 00:11:53,872
Google claims this is their
first privacy policy,
which it isn't.

221
00:11:53,874 --> 00:11:57,342
So why would google not include
its original privacy policy

222
00:11:57,344 --> 00:11:59,411
On its own archives page--

223
00:11:59,413 --> 00:12:01,313
The one that said you would
remain anonymous?

224
00:12:01,315 --> 00:12:04,149
What if the data collection
that the patriot act required

225
00:12:04,151 --> 00:12:06,618
Became the foundation of
a whole new business model,

226
00:12:06,620 --> 00:12:10,122
And the foundation of the modern
internet as we know it?

227
00:12:10,124 --> 00:12:12,157
Would that be something
worth covering up?

228
00:12:12,159 --> 00:12:13,859
And even though we don't write
checks to google,

229
00:12:13,861 --> 00:12:16,661
And that's one of the reasons
we kind of like the company,

230
00:12:16,663 --> 00:12:19,531
It doesn't mean that google's
really free,

231
00:12:19,533 --> 00:12:23,435
Or that we are free in the
liberty sense when we use it.

232
00:12:23,437 --> 00:12:27,272
It might feel very different
if google was effectively

233
00:12:27,274 --> 00:12:29,908
A $500-a-year service,

234
00:12:29,910 --> 00:12:33,812
Because that's the value
of the data that you're
providing.

235
00:12:33,814 --> 00:12:36,281
I mean, that was a really
critical finding,

236
00:12:36,283 --> 00:12:40,452
That advertising could be
targeted based on information

237
00:12:40,454 --> 00:12:43,589
That people were somehow
supplying about themselves.

238
00:12:43,591 --> 00:12:45,891
Suddenly, you didn't
have to wonder,

239
00:12:45,893 --> 00:12:47,793
Was somebody watching
my commercial?

240
00:12:47,795 --> 00:12:50,796
You knew. Someone
clicked on my ad.

241
00:12:50,798 --> 00:12:53,332
That meant that they
paid attention to it.

242
00:12:53,334 --> 00:12:58,070
[narrator] in 2012, google
was one of the most valuable
stocks in the world.

243
00:12:58,072 --> 00:12:59,805
And mark zuckerberg,
the founder of facebook,

244
00:12:59,807 --> 00:13:02,174
Had become one of
the richest men in america.

245
00:13:02,176 --> 00:13:05,377
My job is to help investors
figure out for themselves

246
00:13:05,379 --> 00:13:07,045
What this thing's worth.

247
00:13:07,047 --> 00:13:09,348
So I look at what facebook
has as an asset,

248
00:13:09,350 --> 00:13:13,985
Which is 900 million people and
a ton of data on those people,

249
00:13:13,987 --> 00:13:17,189
And I say if they use 10%
of that data,

250
00:13:17,191 --> 00:13:19,258
They're going to be the most
valuable company ever.

251
00:13:19,260 --> 00:13:21,793
[narrator] when personal data
is worth this much,

252
00:13:21,795 --> 00:13:23,895
Why would google, or any free
internet service,

253
00:13:23,897 --> 00:13:26,798
Be opposed to the data retention
that the patriot act required?

254
00:13:26,800 --> 00:13:29,600
Anonymity wasn't profitable.

255
00:13:29,602 --> 00:13:33,504
People who are willing
to give up information

256
00:13:33,506 --> 00:13:36,742
In exchange for having access
to something that's free,

257
00:13:36,744 --> 00:13:40,412
Or something that's fun,
or a free taco.

258
00:13:40,414 --> 00:13:41,680
I don't think
that ever changes.

259
00:13:41,682 --> 00:13:43,715
You always want
something free.

260
00:13:43,717 --> 00:13:47,986
And plenty of people
are willing to provide
information to get that.

261
00:13:47,988 --> 00:13:50,622
[narrator] and plenty
of companies picked up
on this fact.

262
00:13:59,065 --> 00:14:03,302
Let me give you some
very practical tips.

263
00:14:03,304 --> 00:14:06,772
First of all, I want everybody
here to be careful

264
00:14:06,774 --> 00:14:10,359
About what you post
on facebook.

265
00:14:10,361 --> 00:14:12,394
What the default settings
are on facebook,

266
00:14:12,396 --> 00:14:15,813
This is how most people
use this technology.

267
00:14:15,815 --> 00:14:20,451
When these companies are
building these systems,
they know that.

268
00:14:20,453 --> 00:14:25,290
[audience member] so why is it
the default for everything
sharing,

269
00:14:25,292 --> 00:14:27,826
Every photo,
when I start facebook?

270
00:14:27,828 --> 00:14:29,294
Why isn't it
just for my friends?

271
00:14:29,296 --> 00:14:31,697
Why is the default
for everybody?

272
00:14:31,699 --> 00:14:33,966
Because it's really confusing
for my mom to figure out

273
00:14:33,968 --> 00:14:36,101
How to just share
to her friends.

274
00:14:36,103 --> 00:14:37,836
The way we've designed
the site is that,

275
00:14:37,838 --> 00:14:39,771
It's a community thing,
right?

276
00:14:39,773 --> 00:14:42,274
So people want to share
with just their friends,

277
00:14:42,276 --> 00:14:44,042
But a lot of people
also want to share with

278
00:14:44,044 --> 00:14:45,977
The community around them.
Right. Right.

279
00:14:45,979 --> 00:14:48,146
I want to share with everyone
who works with me at facebook.

280
00:14:48,148 --> 00:14:50,248
I want to share with everyone
who went to my college,

281
00:14:50,250 --> 00:14:52,284
Everyone in the village
around me.

282
00:14:52,286 --> 00:14:55,086
And those people aren't
just my friends.

283
00:14:55,088 --> 00:14:57,489
[narrator] even mark's
explanation doesn't make
any sense.

284
00:14:57,491 --> 00:14:59,291
He says he wants to share
with the school,

285
00:14:59,293 --> 00:15:00,959
With the quaint village
next to him.

286
00:15:00,961 --> 00:15:03,795
He doesn't say he wants
to share with the entire world.

287
00:15:03,797 --> 00:15:05,696
And yet, that's the default.

288
00:15:05,698 --> 00:15:07,099
The challenge with defaults

289
00:15:07,101 --> 00:15:10,402
Is that you get comfortable
with whatever the default is.

290
00:15:10,404 --> 00:15:12,503
When the default is public,

291
00:15:12,505 --> 00:15:15,807
You actually can adapt really
beautifully and deal with it.

292
00:15:15,809 --> 00:15:17,476
When the default is private,

293
00:15:17,478 --> 00:15:19,778
You can adapt comfortably
and deal with it.

294
00:15:19,780 --> 00:15:23,615
When the defaults change,
that's when problems emerge.

295
00:15:23,617 --> 00:15:26,017
[narrator] and in fact,
that's what facebook did.

296
00:15:26,019 --> 00:15:29,287
In 2009, facebook made changes
to their privacy policy

297
00:15:29,289 --> 00:15:30,889
Without telling anyone.

298
00:15:30,891 --> 00:15:34,726
Doing a privacy change
for 350 million users is--

299
00:15:34,728 --> 00:15:39,331
Is not the type of thing
that a lot of companies
would do.

300
00:15:39,333 --> 00:15:41,166
We decided that these would
be the social norms now,

301
00:15:41,168 --> 00:15:43,101
And we just went for it.

302
00:15:43,103 --> 00:15:45,804
[narrator] you might
remember the fan page
with over a million people

303
00:15:45,806 --> 00:15:47,672
Who tried to get
the policy reversed.

304
00:15:47,674 --> 00:15:49,741
What was the big deal,
you might ask?

305
00:15:49,743 --> 00:15:51,209
Well, over the course of
a night,

306
00:15:51,211 --> 00:15:53,645
Facebook turned what was
once private information

307
00:15:53,647 --> 00:15:56,515
Into totally public
information.

308
00:16:03,122 --> 00:16:04,189
These platforms
have an incentive

309
00:16:04,191 --> 00:16:06,691
To keep as much information

310
00:16:06,693 --> 00:16:09,294
About you and make it
as visible as possible.

311
00:16:12,265 --> 00:16:14,066
It's almost the question
then becomes,

312
00:16:14,068 --> 00:16:17,202
What's the less
forgivable sin,

313
00:16:17,204 --> 00:16:19,171
Having this crazy
one night stand

314
00:16:19,173 --> 00:16:21,973
Or not knowing how
to use facebook properly.

315
00:16:32,818 --> 00:16:35,620
Most relationships
in your life,

316
00:16:35,622 --> 00:16:40,125
It's very good that the other
person doesn't know everything

317
00:16:40,127 --> 00:16:45,530
You've ever said,
or scribbled, or thought.

318
00:16:52,838 --> 00:16:55,307
When you choose to share
a photo album,

319
00:16:55,309 --> 00:16:58,343
You go to facebook and you
choose to put those photos
there.

320
00:17:02,048 --> 00:17:05,083
Just have an opt in on every
single thing.

321
00:17:05,085 --> 00:17:06,184
Opt in--

322
00:17:08,788 --> 00:17:10,822
Opt in--

323
00:17:10,824 --> 00:17:11,823
Opt in.

324
00:17:15,928 --> 00:17:19,030
I'm okay with facebook
behaving like a company.

325
00:17:19,032 --> 00:17:22,267
But I think we need to
treat it like a company,

326
00:17:22,269 --> 00:17:26,338
And not treat it like
some benign public utility.

327
00:17:26,340 --> 00:17:29,373
[narrator] these are the default
settings on facebook in 2005,

328
00:17:29,375 --> 00:17:31,076
Divided into 12 categories.

329
00:17:31,078 --> 00:17:34,779
As time passes, more and more
information is shared by
default.

330
00:17:34,781 --> 00:17:38,650
In 2009, facebook began
automatically sharing
personal information

331
00:17:38,652 --> 00:17:40,384
With the entire internet.

332
00:17:40,386 --> 00:17:42,787
By 2010, everything was shared
by default,

333
00:17:42,789 --> 00:17:46,090
Except for your contact info
and your birthday.

334
00:17:46,092 --> 00:17:47,959
We could, if you did
a search, and a gmail,

335
00:17:47,961 --> 00:17:50,562
And a youtube and so forth
yesterday,

336
00:17:50,564 --> 00:17:53,498
And you did it from your home--
I'll give you the worst case.

337
00:17:53,500 --> 00:17:55,834
You did it from your home,
and you only have one
computer in your home.

338
00:17:55,836 --> 00:17:58,470
In theory we could
cross-correlate those

339
00:17:58,472 --> 00:18:00,172
And get all three together.

340
00:18:00,174 --> 00:18:03,375
We don't do that and we're
not likely to do that.

341
00:18:03,377 --> 00:18:05,110
[narrator]
but in January of 2012

342
00:18:05,112 --> 00:18:07,646
Google made changes
to tir privacy policy,

343
00:18:07,648 --> 00:18:09,781
And they did just that.

344
00:18:09,783 --> 00:18:11,716
Google combined l
of the information

345
00:18:11,718 --> 00:18:14,185
Any of the services had
collected about a person

346
00:18:14,187 --> 00:18:16,988
And put them into
one ngle profile.

347
00:18:16,990 --> 00:18:19,824
What eric schmidt had said
was the worst-case scenao,

348
00:18:19,826 --> 00:18:21,960
Gole had actually done.

349
00:18:29,101 --> 00:18:32,504
How can you honestly sit here

350
00:18:32,506 --> 00:18:35,940
And tell this committee
this is not a growing problem?

351
00:18:35,942 --> 00:18:38,343
A good deal of what
I was trying to say

352
00:18:38,345 --> 00:18:41,145
Is that I don't think there's
evidence of market failure

353
00:18:41,147 --> 00:18:44,549
Or consumer harm from
the legal and legitimate use

354
00:18:44,551 --> 00:18:50,021
Of personal information
in commerce.

355
00:18:50,023 --> 00:18:53,157
I don't think there's
evidence of it.

356
00:18:53,159 --> 00:18:55,660
There are companies that you've
never heard of, like acxiom,

357
00:18:55,662 --> 00:18:59,764
That claim to have about 1500
points of data on the average
american citizen,

358
00:18:59,766 --> 00:19:03,501
Everything from, you know,
whether you're right-handed
or left-handed,

359
00:19:03,503 --> 00:19:04,769
What kind of dog you have,

360
00:19:04,771 --> 00:19:06,771
What your sort of
psychological outlook is,

361
00:19:06,773 --> 00:19:10,441
And all of that can be
used to inform decisions

362
00:19:10,443 --> 00:19:12,877
That businesses make
about us as well.

363
00:19:12,879 --> 00:19:16,314
These are the types of companies
that a potential employer

364
00:19:16,316 --> 00:19:18,583
Would go to to try and run a
background check on somebody

365
00:19:18,585 --> 00:19:19,784
Before they hired them.

366
00:19:19,786 --> 00:19:22,153
They're able to connect the fact

367
00:19:22,155 --> 00:19:24,389
That you went to site a,

368
00:19:24,391 --> 00:19:25,590
And then later to site b,

369
00:19:25,592 --> 00:19:27,058
And then eventually to site c,

370
00:19:27,060 --> 00:19:29,394
And create this detailed history

371
00:19:29,396 --> 00:19:30,962
Of what sites you visit online.

372
00:19:30,964 --> 00:19:32,998
[man] they don't put your name
in the cookie.

373
00:19:33,000 --> 00:19:35,433
They put a unique
serial number in the cookie

374
00:19:35,435 --> 00:19:37,902
That can then be linked
to your name in their database.

375
00:19:37,904 --> 00:19:41,473
I don't know if you've
ever seen the picture

376
00:19:41,475 --> 00:19:43,207
Of the ad network ecosystem

377
00:19:43,209 --> 00:19:46,044
That shows all the parties
in the ad network ecosystem.

378
00:19:46,046 --> 00:19:49,014
It's a bit overwhelming.

379
00:19:49,016 --> 00:19:52,417
The information is valuable
to different people for
different reasons.

380
00:19:52,419 --> 00:19:54,151
What if you buy
a lot of alcohol?

381
00:19:54,153 --> 00:19:56,688
You know, they might want
to raise your premiums

382
00:19:56,690 --> 00:19:59,991
Because they think you're
at risk for alcoholism
or something like that.

383
00:19:59,993 --> 00:20:04,763
The company might use it
in a way that actually
harms you.

384
00:20:04,765 --> 00:20:07,332
[narrator]
for example, in 2008,

385
00:20:07,334 --> 00:20:09,634
Thousands of people suddenly
had their credit limits reduced,

386
00:20:09,636 --> 00:20:10,968
Seemingly for no reason.

387
00:20:10,970 --> 00:20:14,272
While on vacation, one wealthy
business owner from atlanta

388
00:20:14,274 --> 00:20:17,041
Saw his limit plummet
from $10,800

389
00:20:17,043 --> 00:20:20,011
To just $3,800,
ruining his vacation.

390
00:20:20,013 --> 00:20:21,279
The letter he received
said this:

391
00:20:21,281 --> 00:20:23,548
"other customers who
have used their card

392
00:20:23,550 --> 00:20:25,283
At establishments
where you recently shopped

393
00:20:25,285 --> 00:20:27,619
Have a poor repayment history
with american express."

394
00:20:27,621 --> 00:20:30,822
This means companies
like wal-mart.

395
00:20:30,824 --> 00:20:33,591
And in minneapolis,
a father came into a target

396
00:20:33,593 --> 00:20:36,994
Outraged that they were sending
his teenaged daughter
pregnancy coupons,

397
00:20:36,996 --> 00:20:39,697
Coupons that were
addressed to her.

398
00:20:39,699 --> 00:20:43,101
The man thought that target
was trying to encourage
his daughter to get pregnant.

399
00:20:43,103 --> 00:20:45,937
As it turned out, thanks
to her shopping habits,

400
00:20:45,939 --> 00:20:50,108
Target knew that this
high-schooler was pregnant
before her own father did.

401
00:20:50,110 --> 00:20:53,944
The father later apologized.

402
00:20:53,946 --> 00:20:57,549
And in the netherlands,
data was being used to harm
customers in a whole new way.

403
00:20:57,551 --> 00:20:59,818
Now, while you're
driving and using a gps,

404
00:20:59,820 --> 00:21:03,187
That gps is sending back
signals to tell how fast
you're moving.

405
00:21:03,189 --> 00:21:05,857
It's really useful
for helping us avoid traffic.

406
00:21:05,859 --> 00:21:08,360
But that got a little company
called tomtom wondering

407
00:21:08,362 --> 00:21:11,029
Who else might be interested
in knowing the speed of traffic.

408
00:21:11,031 --> 00:21:14,299
And so in the netherlands,
the data that people
were willingly trading

409
00:21:14,301 --> 00:21:16,701
To find a faster way home was
being sold to the authorities

410
00:21:16,703 --> 00:21:18,903
To give those
same drivers tickets.

411
00:21:26,979 --> 00:21:30,315
Is the reason we don't have any
baseline consumer privacy law

412
00:21:30,317 --> 00:21:32,450
Because of the fbi? No.

413
00:21:32,452 --> 00:21:35,186
That is largely due to
lobbying by companies

414
00:21:35,188 --> 00:21:38,089
That have built extremely
lucrative businesses

415
00:21:38,091 --> 00:21:39,991
Around these business activities

416
00:21:39,993 --> 00:21:43,294
And don't want to do
anything to disrupt that.

417
00:21:43,296 --> 00:21:46,698
Under facebook's terms
and conditions,

418
00:21:46,700 --> 00:21:49,267
A user must be 13 or older.

419
00:21:49,269 --> 00:21:53,938
Despite this, according to a
recent consumers' report study,

420
00:21:53,940 --> 00:21:57,876
An estimated 7 1/2 million users
were younger than 13.

421
00:21:57,878 --> 00:22:02,514
First of all, we don't allow
people to have accounts
under the age of 13.

422
00:22:02,516 --> 00:22:06,250
And my reaction to that
is that's just absolutely
indefensible.

423
00:22:06,252 --> 00:22:08,553
I mean, it's unbelievable
that you would say that.

424
00:22:08,555 --> 00:22:11,756
Well, senator, I just want to
say we-- we really emphatically
agree with your points.

425
00:22:11,758 --> 00:22:14,726
They say that facebook sent
an army of lawyers

426
00:22:14,728 --> 00:22:17,261
So that the final privacy
legislation that emerged

427
00:22:17,263 --> 00:22:20,498
In 2011 was watered down
significantly

428
00:22:20,500 --> 00:22:23,034
In a way that wouldn't affect
facebook's business model.

429
00:22:23,036 --> 00:22:26,670
My name is alan davidson,
and I am the director
of public policy

430
00:22:26,672 --> 00:22:28,206
For google in north
and south america.

431
00:22:28,208 --> 00:22:30,742
My message today is simple.

432
00:22:30,744 --> 00:22:34,746
As we've heard, mobile services
create enormous social and
economic benefits.

433
00:22:34,748 --> 00:22:38,983
I reject the notion
that privacy protection

434
00:22:38,985 --> 00:22:40,384
Is the enemy of innovation.

435
00:22:40,386 --> 00:22:44,189
It absolutely doesn't
have to be, and isn't.

436
00:22:44,191 --> 00:22:46,991
[narrator]
it was an expensive
year of lobbying for
these big companies.

437
00:22:46,993 --> 00:22:49,694
Google spent five times
as much as the year before,

438
00:22:49,696 --> 00:22:52,397
And facebook spent
four times as much.

439
00:22:52,399 --> 00:22:57,268
Senate bill 242 will protect
users of social networking
internet sites.

440
00:22:57,270 --> 00:23:00,872
It will protect these users
from identity theft

441
00:23:00,874 --> 00:23:05,709
And from unwanted contact
by keeping their private
information private,

442
00:23:05,711 --> 00:23:08,046
Of course unless
they agree to share it.

443
00:23:08,048 --> 00:23:10,615
I know that many members
including myself

444
00:23:10,617 --> 00:23:13,751
Do not want to negatively impact

445
00:23:13,753 --> 00:23:16,287
A very important industry
for the state of california.

446
00:23:16,289 --> 00:23:19,524
Individuals involved
in this industry

447
00:23:19,526 --> 00:23:22,160
Don't want to see
any regulation whatsoever,

448
00:23:22,162 --> 00:23:24,796
So I think that's
really the key.

449
00:23:24,798 --> 00:23:28,333
And one of the most
interesting things I've found
in these conversations

450
00:23:28,335 --> 00:23:30,535
Is that many members
of the legislature

451
00:23:30,537 --> 00:23:34,806
Don't even have
social network sites

452
00:23:34,808 --> 00:23:37,141
Because they're concerned
about their privacy.

453
00:23:37,143 --> 00:23:39,477
And at the time the bill was
being heard,

454
00:23:39,479 --> 00:23:42,146
Although lobbyists were in the
committee room

455
00:23:42,148 --> 00:23:45,884
For the entire hearing, they
did not come forward to speak.

456
00:23:45,886 --> 00:23:48,453
So it was sort of an
interesting process,

457
00:23:48,455 --> 00:23:50,922
Sort of a stealth killing
of the bill,

458
00:23:50,924 --> 00:23:54,025
Without the opportunity
for the public to really see

459
00:23:54,027 --> 00:23:55,260
Who was in opposition,

460
00:23:55,262 --> 00:23:57,628
So people like google
and facebook

461
00:23:57,630 --> 00:24:01,366
Were in strong opposition.
Facebook in particular.

462
00:24:01,368 --> 00:24:04,168
What did facebook have to lose?

463
00:24:04,170 --> 00:24:09,306
You know, I really do not
understand their logic,

464
00:24:09,308 --> 00:24:12,110
And you'd have to
ask them about that,

465
00:24:12,112 --> 00:24:15,045
But when I analyze
an issue like this--

466
00:24:15,047 --> 00:24:17,982
I'd love to ask them about that.
They won't talk to me.

467
00:24:17,984 --> 00:24:19,817
[laughs] I'm not surprised.

468
00:24:19,819 --> 00:24:24,622
I don't think-- I don't think
the rules of law and regulation

469
00:24:24,624 --> 00:24:29,761
Necessarily apply when it comes
to interacting with a company

470
00:24:29,763 --> 00:24:31,029
That wants to sell you
something.

471
00:24:31,031 --> 00:24:33,998
Yeah. We should be worried.

472
00:24:35,400 --> 00:24:37,401
[narrator] but worried
about what?

473
00:24:37,403 --> 00:24:40,271
Sure, the data collection
allowed by privacy policies

474
00:24:40,273 --> 00:24:45,043
Had fueled commerce. But was
there something more serious
we were agreeing to?

475
00:24:55,287 --> 00:24:58,322
[narrator]
total information awareness.

476
00:24:58,324 --> 00:25:01,826
A program initiated by the
government in January of 2002.

477
00:25:01,828 --> 00:25:06,331
Its mission? To collect every
digital transmission imaginable.

478
00:25:06,333 --> 00:25:09,533
And yes,
this was their real symbol,

479
00:25:09,535 --> 00:25:12,737
They eye of the pyramid,
scanning the earth with
a laser beam.

480
00:25:12,739 --> 00:25:17,175
It actually looks oddly
similar to what's inside
mark zuckerberg's hoodie.

481
00:25:17,177 --> 00:25:18,643
Making the world more
open and connected.

482
00:25:18,645 --> 00:25:22,480
Oh my god!
It's like a secret cult!

483
00:25:22,482 --> 00:25:25,883
Total information awareness
was a program designed
to connect the dots,

484
00:25:25,885 --> 00:25:31,756
To link banking activities
to flight searches
to online activities.

485
00:25:31,758 --> 00:25:34,491
[reporter] but the pentagon
is clearly moving to create

486
00:25:34,493 --> 00:25:36,961
The largest electronic eye ever,

487
00:25:36,963 --> 00:25:40,097
To look at any
and all americans.

488
00:25:40,099 --> 00:25:42,800
You're looking for trends
and transactions

489
00:25:42,802 --> 00:25:46,904
That are associated with
some potential terrorist act.

490
00:25:46,906 --> 00:25:50,475
They believe that
with enough data,

491
00:25:50,477 --> 00:25:53,778
That they can predict who would
be engaging in nefarious crimes.

492
00:25:53,780 --> 00:25:55,346
[narrator]
the public was outraged.

493
00:25:55,348 --> 00:25:58,416
Congress was outraged.
The program was shut down.

494
00:25:58,418 --> 00:26:00,317
The lesson that
the government learned

495
00:26:00,319 --> 00:26:03,488
After the failure of total
information awareness

496
00:26:03,490 --> 00:26:07,792
Was that if you're going
to create a gigantic
spying program,

497
00:26:07,794 --> 00:26:10,127
Don't give it a creepy name.

498
00:26:10,129 --> 00:26:13,330
There's nothing to prevent
them from developing
the same capabilities,

499
00:26:13,332 --> 00:26:16,734
Just in smarter ways,
from their standpoint.

500
00:26:21,840 --> 00:26:24,742
[bush] a wiretap requires
a court order.

501
00:26:24,744 --> 00:26:27,745
Nothing has changed,
by the way.

502
00:26:27,747 --> 00:26:30,615
[narrator] but in reality,
lots had changed.

503
00:26:30,617 --> 00:26:33,250
How we were told
one day in late 2002

504
00:26:33,252 --> 00:26:37,822
That an nsa representative
was coming to the office.

505
00:26:37,824 --> 00:26:41,325
Mark klein came to us at the
electronic frontier foundation

506
00:26:41,327 --> 00:26:45,496
With data and documents
that showed that

507
00:26:45,498 --> 00:26:49,233
At&t was engaged
in a wiretapping program.

508
00:26:49,235 --> 00:26:52,270
The nsa is much
different from the cia.

509
00:26:52,272 --> 00:26:55,006
First of all, it's about
three times the size,

510
00:26:55,008 --> 00:26:57,141
It costs far more,

511
00:26:57,143 --> 00:27:01,779
It's tremendously more
secret than the cia,

512
00:27:01,781 --> 00:27:04,649
And what it does
is very different.

513
00:27:04,651 --> 00:27:07,585
It's focused on eavesdropping,

514
00:27:07,587 --> 00:27:10,455
On tapping into major
communications links.

515
00:27:10,457 --> 00:27:12,857
They actually had a secret
room in their facilities,

516
00:27:12,859 --> 00:27:18,029
And they were creating
a copy of internet traffic
and sending it to the nsa.

517
00:27:18,031 --> 00:27:20,832
So in a sense, they are
vacuuming up, scooping up
every--

518
00:27:20,834 --> 00:27:25,670
They are blindly vacuuming up
everything going across those
links.

519
00:27:25,672 --> 00:27:26,904
And you're certain of that.

520
00:27:26,906 --> 00:27:28,439
I'm certain of that.

521
00:27:28,441 --> 00:27:29,807
[narrator] so president bush
owned up to it.

522
00:27:29,809 --> 00:27:33,578
I authorized the national
security agency

523
00:27:33,580 --> 00:27:37,014
To intercept the
international communications

524
00:27:37,016 --> 00:27:40,718
Of people with known leaks--
links to al-qaeda

525
00:27:40,720 --> 00:27:44,254
And related terrorist
organizations.

526
00:27:44,256 --> 00:27:47,125
It's taken less than 24 hours
after the bush presidency ended

527
00:27:47,127 --> 00:27:49,427
For a former analyst
at the national security agency

528
00:27:49,429 --> 00:27:51,362
To come forward to reveal
new allegations

529
00:27:51,364 --> 00:27:53,931
About how this nation was spied
on by its own government.

530
00:27:53,933 --> 00:27:56,267
The national security
agency had access

531
00:27:56,269 --> 00:27:58,068
To all americans'
communications,

532
00:27:58,070 --> 00:28:04,075
Faxes, phone calls, and
their computer communications.

533
00:28:04,077 --> 00:28:06,977
Is there a recording somewhere
of every conversation I had

534
00:28:06,979 --> 00:28:09,080
With my little nephew
in upstate new york?

535
00:28:09,082 --> 00:28:10,281
Is it like that?

536
00:28:10,283 --> 00:28:11,916
It would be everything, yes.

537
00:28:11,918 --> 00:28:15,353
Um-- it would be everything.

538
00:28:15,355 --> 00:28:19,157
[narrator] but then a beacon of
hope arrived in the white house.

539
00:28:19,159 --> 00:28:21,692
Hi, senator obama,
I appreciate your giving us

540
00:28:21,694 --> 00:28:23,628
The opportunity
to ask you questions.

541
00:28:23,630 --> 00:28:26,731
I'm an attorney who
represents federal
whistleblowers,

542
00:28:26,733 --> 00:28:28,382
And I was very
disappointed when
I learned

543
00:28:28,384 --> 00:28:32,103
That you
supported the bill

544
00:28:32,105 --> 00:28:35,706
That lets phone companies
off the hook

545
00:28:35,708 --> 00:28:39,543
When they've helped
the federal government,

546
00:28:39,545 --> 00:28:44,899
Without warrant,
wiretap phones.

547
00:28:44,901 --> 00:28:47,385
I recognize that
some people feel like,

548
00:28:47,387 --> 00:28:49,954
Yeah, well, the phone
companies still were
complicit in this;

549
00:28:49,956 --> 00:28:51,789
They should be held
accountable still.

550
00:28:51,791 --> 00:28:53,391
I understand that argument.

551
00:28:53,393 --> 00:28:55,660
But the problem was that
the surveillance program

552
00:28:55,662 --> 00:28:58,963
Is actually one that
I believe is necessary
for our national security.

553
00:28:58,965 --> 00:29:03,501
So they were immune, but that
means that the programs were
still shut down, right?

554
00:29:03,503 --> 00:29:06,804
The-- the programs
were shut down?

555
00:29:06,806 --> 00:29:08,706
Yeah, e wiretapping
programs.

556
00:29:08,708 --> 00:29:10,307
I have no reason to believe

557
00:29:10,309 --> 00:29:12,276
That the wiretapping programs
have been shut down.

558
00:29:12,278 --> 00:29:16,214
No, if the wiretapping programs
had been shut down

559
00:29:16,216 --> 00:29:19,016
Then I don't believe
that the government

560
00:29:19,018 --> 00:29:21,485
Anat&t would still
be fighting in court

561
00:29:21,487 --> 00:29:24,822
For the lelity of it.

562
00:29:24,824 --> 00:29:27,391
So barack obama has't
changed anything?

563
00:29:27,393 --> 00:29:29,994
No, barack obama did not
shut those progrs down

564
00:29:29,996 --> 00:29:31,495
After he took office,

565
00:29:31,497 --> 00:29:40,871
Even though he had threatened
to before he became president.

566
00:29:40,873 --> 00:29:44,675
[zuckerberg]
when we got started just
in my dorm room at harvard,

567
00:29:44,677 --> 00:29:47,545
Um, the question that
a lot of people asked was,

568
00:29:47,547 --> 00:29:50,848
Why would I want
to put any information
on the internet at all?

569
00:29:50,850 --> 00:29:52,383
Like, why would I want
to have a website?

570
00:29:52,385 --> 00:29:54,384
And people have really
gotten comfortable

571
00:29:54,386 --> 00:29:56,887
Not only sharing more
information and different kinds,

572
00:29:56,889 --> 00:29:58,890
But more openly
and with more people.

573
00:29:58,892 --> 00:30:02,460
And that social norm
is just something that's
evolved over time.

574
00:30:02,462 --> 00:30:06,497
You may have seen the "onion"
take on facebook, which was,

575
00:30:06,499 --> 00:30:11,903
The cia has just announced
its most recent handy
invention-- facebook!

576
00:30:11,905 --> 00:30:14,638
According to department of
homeland security reports,

577
00:30:14,640 --> 00:30:16,474
Facebook has replaced
almost every other

578
00:30:16,476 --> 00:30:20,544
Cia information-gathering
program since it was
launched in 2004.

579
00:30:20,546 --> 00:30:23,247
After years of secretly
monitoring the public,

580
00:30:23,249 --> 00:30:26,584
We were astounded so many people
would willingly publicize

581
00:30:26,586 --> 00:30:28,953
Where they lived, their
religious and political views,

582
00:30:28,955 --> 00:30:31,389
And alphabetized lists
of all their friends,

583
00:30:31,391 --> 00:30:36,193
Personal email addresses,
phone numbers, hundreds
of photos of themselves,

584
00:30:36,195 --> 00:30:39,797
And even status updates about
what they were doing moment
to moment.

585
00:30:39,799 --> 00:30:42,666
It is truly a dream
come true for the cia.

586
00:30:42,668 --> 00:30:45,469
You know, the fbis
and the nsas of the world

587
00:30:45,471 --> 00:30:48,939
Are appreciative of the fact
that google and facebook,

588
00:30:48,941 --> 00:30:52,275
You know, have built business
models around collecting user
data,

589
00:30:52,277 --> 00:30:53,878
Because it makes
their jobs much easier.

590
00:30:53,880 --> 00:30:56,780
That article in time started
with this anecdote:

591
00:30:56,782 --> 00:30:59,583
They're sitting in their
transparent cubicle

592
00:30:59,585 --> 00:31:01,919
In their open space,
in facebook.

593
00:31:01,921 --> 00:31:06,223
Robert mueller was the one man
in the room with a tie on,

594
00:31:06,225 --> 00:31:08,125
And he was older, in a suit.

595
00:31:08,127 --> 00:31:10,394
And he comes in and he says,
I was just in the building

596
00:31:10,396 --> 00:31:12,830
And I wanted to say hello
to mark zuckerberg.

597
00:31:12,832 --> 00:31:14,398
So he says hello
to mark zuckerberg,

598
00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:16,867
A little chitchat
and then he leaves.

599
00:31:16,869 --> 00:31:19,303
And everybody's saying,
what the hell was that?

600
00:31:19,305 --> 00:31:22,573
Now, nobody asks
the question,

601
00:31:22,575 --> 00:31:25,609
Why was mueller
in the building?

602
00:31:25,611 --> 00:31:26,944
He's the head of the fbi.

603
00:31:29,014 --> 00:31:31,582
So on the one hand,
mark zuckerberg has said

604
00:31:31,584 --> 00:31:34,685
He wants to create
a more open society,

605
00:31:34,687 --> 00:31:36,988
And facebook
is a way to do that.

606
00:31:36,990 --> 00:31:39,490
On the other hand, you know,

607
00:31:39,492 --> 00:31:43,494
There's a lot about the way
facebook uses information
that people don't know.

608
00:31:43,496 --> 00:31:45,363
[narrator] if only
there was a way of knowing

609
00:31:45,365 --> 00:31:48,099
How much information these
companies were storing about us.

610
00:31:48,101 --> 00:31:50,734
Well, in the case of facebook,

611
00:31:50,736 --> 00:31:52,236
We learned some pretty
interesting things

612
00:31:52,238 --> 00:31:54,138
Thanks to one student
in austria.

613
00:31:54,140 --> 00:31:57,608
And, unlike the us, europe has
a law that requires a company

614
00:31:57,610 --> 00:31:59,844
To tell a customer what data
they have stored on them

615
00:31:59,846 --> 00:32:01,345
If that customer wants to know.

616
00:32:01,347 --> 00:32:04,515
And facebook, unlike most
major internet companies,

617
00:32:04,517 --> 00:32:07,018
Had actually built a
headquarters in europe.

618
00:32:07,020 --> 00:32:09,820
Apparently we're like, the only
three people that were like,

619
00:32:09,822 --> 00:32:12,990
Pushing hard enough and asking
again and again and again

620
00:32:12,992 --> 00:32:15,092
And going through also
the irish authority

621
00:32:15,094 --> 00:32:18,996
To finally get at least like
a bigger part of our data set.

622
00:32:18,998 --> 00:32:20,731
We still didn't get
everything right now.

623
00:32:20,733 --> 00:32:24,869
Got it right here, just to
have an idea of how much it
actually is.

624
00:32:24,871 --> 00:32:29,640
That's like, just to picture
it to see how much it is.

625
00:32:29,642 --> 00:32:32,376
Can I hold it? Wow, this
is more than a baby.

626
00:32:32,378 --> 00:32:35,646
Yeah. That's 1,222 pages.

627
00:32:35,648 --> 00:32:37,314
I'm a member of facebook
for three years,

628
00:32:37,316 --> 00:32:39,617
But I was using it
more intense

629
00:32:39,619 --> 00:32:41,519
For like the last
one and a half years or so.

630
00:32:41,521 --> 00:32:44,522
What's interesting as well
is that I didn't post
too much, actually.

631
00:32:44,524 --> 00:32:46,690
I'm a person who posts
something like once a week
or so.

632
00:32:46,692 --> 00:32:49,560
With this giant ream of
information in front of me,

633
00:32:49,562 --> 00:32:53,330
Is it hard to go through it
and actually find specific
details about a person?

634
00:32:53,332 --> 00:32:54,698
No, that's super-easy,
'cause it's--

635
00:32:54,700 --> 00:32:58,335
I mean, we just used
the search function
in the pdf file.

636
00:32:58,337 --> 00:32:59,770
So you just type in one word,

637
00:32:59,772 --> 00:33:01,505
Let's say
"demonstration" or "sex"

638
00:33:01,507 --> 00:33:03,074
Or political party or something,

639
00:33:03,076 --> 00:33:05,675
And within a second you find
the right information.

640
00:33:05,677 --> 00:33:08,679
So within a couple of minutes
you can figure out what people
voted for,

641
00:33:08,681 --> 00:33:11,048
What, I don't know,
psychological problems
they have,

642
00:33:11,050 --> 00:33:14,151
What parties they've been to,

643
00:33:14,153 --> 00:33:16,821
All these informations
are like really easy to find,
actually.

644
00:33:16,823 --> 00:33:19,323
While using that service
for such a short time,

645
00:33:19,325 --> 00:33:21,926
You still had a data file that's
bigger than anything that

646
00:33:21,928 --> 00:33:24,528
Any cia, fbi, or, I don't know,

647
00:33:24,530 --> 00:33:26,831
Stasi ever had about
an average person.

648
00:33:26,833 --> 00:33:30,101
If you hit the remove button,
it just means it's flagged as
deleted.

649
00:33:30,103 --> 00:33:32,837
So, um, you hide it actually
from yourself.

650
00:33:32,839 --> 00:33:36,507
But anyone like facebook
or any government agency

651
00:33:36,509 --> 00:33:39,376
That wants to look at it
later can still retrieve it
and get it back.

652
00:33:39,378 --> 00:33:42,980
And that means that it's
there for an indefinite time,

653
00:33:42,982 --> 00:33:45,249
Um, even though you hit
the delete button

654
00:33:45,251 --> 00:33:48,586
And they ask you three times
if you really really want
to delete it.

655
00:33:48,588 --> 00:33:49,887
It's not actually gone?

656
00:33:49,889 --> 00:33:51,655
It's not actually gone.
It's still there.

657
00:33:59,130 --> 00:34:02,433
So we've ultimately adopted
roughly the following rule.

658
00:34:02,435 --> 00:34:07,505
We-- think of it as we
anonymize the information
within 18 months.

659
00:34:07,507 --> 00:34:09,940
It might be anonymized
within 18 months,

660
00:34:09,942 --> 00:34:13,344
But all of the searches we've
ever done are still there.

661
00:34:13,346 --> 00:34:17,447
The underlying data is still
there to be de-anonymized at
some point.

662
00:34:17,449 --> 00:34:20,985
[narrator] and de-anonymizing
search records turns out to be
shockingly easy.

663
00:34:20,987 --> 00:34:25,156
That is, taking private searches
and finding out whose records
they are.

664
00:34:25,158 --> 00:34:28,559
In 2006, aol turned over
a bunch of these anonymized
search records

665
00:34:28,561 --> 00:34:29,994
Of their users to the public.

666
00:34:29,996 --> 00:34:31,895
And it only took
a few short hours

667
00:34:31,897 --> 00:34:36,299
For a reporter to decode
who user number 4417749 was.

668
00:34:36,301 --> 00:34:39,570
Between searches for things
like "numb fingers", "'60s
single men",

669
00:34:39,572 --> 00:34:41,372
And "dog that urinates
on everything,"

670
00:34:41,374 --> 00:34:43,974
The reporter uncovered a woman
named thelma arnold.

671
00:34:43,976 --> 00:34:45,709
She was age 62.

672
00:34:45,711 --> 00:34:49,512
But then there's user 17556639,

673
00:34:49,514 --> 00:34:52,383
Who looked up "how to kill
your wife", multiple times,

674
00:34:52,385 --> 00:34:54,218
Along with "decapitated photos",

675
00:34:54,220 --> 00:34:57,721
And then in the middle,
the user actually looks up
"steak and cheese."

676
00:34:57,723 --> 00:34:59,422
Steak and cheese!

677
00:34:59,424 --> 00:35:01,358
And there were plenty
of users online

678
00:35:01,360 --> 00:35:03,561
Who were quick to judge
what was going on here.

679
00:35:03,563 --> 00:35:05,429
It was murder.

680
00:35:11,970 --> 00:35:13,871
Rainey, easy.
Hey, old friend!

681
00:35:13,873 --> 00:35:16,674
So let's take a seat and
I'm gonna show you something.

682
00:35:16,676 --> 00:35:18,776
Okay.

683
00:35:18,778 --> 00:35:23,046
What I'm showing you here
is a list of anonymized
search records.

684
00:35:23,048 --> 00:35:26,617
Um, these records
were released by aol.

685
00:35:26,619 --> 00:35:29,620
Have you-- are there actually
things on this list

686
00:35:29,622 --> 00:35:31,922
That you know you've searched
for before?

687
00:35:31,924 --> 00:35:37,161
Um, sure. Yeah, I've definitely
looked up "car crash photos",

688
00:35:37,163 --> 00:35:38,562
I've definitely typed in
"decapitated",

689
00:35:38,564 --> 00:35:41,232
I've definitely looked up
"dead people photos",

690
00:35:41,234 --> 00:35:44,435
"wife killer"   I've definitely
looked up "wife killer".

691
00:35:44,437 --> 00:35:47,705
In fact, I've looked up
every single search term
I'm looking at here.

692
00:35:47,707 --> 00:35:50,874
[narrator] you see,
jerome had been a writer
on "cold case",

693
00:35:50,876 --> 00:35:54,178
A tv show where each week cops
have to solve a murder mystery.

694
00:35:54,180 --> 00:35:55,913
Well, that's always
what scared me

695
00:35:55,915 --> 00:35:57,414
When I was entering
those search terms,

696
00:35:57,416 --> 00:35:59,350
Was if there's some sort
of automated system

697
00:35:59,352 --> 00:36:02,252
That just red-flags you based
on the search term.

698
00:36:02,254 --> 00:36:03,454
They're not gonna look and say,

699
00:36:03,456 --> 00:36:05,256
Oh, yeah, he was probably
working on a tv show,

700
00:36:05,258 --> 00:36:06,890
And that's why
he was just googling

701
00:36:06,892 --> 00:36:08,926
"how to murder
my cheating wife."

702
00:36:08,928 --> 00:36:10,794
What?

703
00:36:10,796 --> 00:36:14,097
I just wanted to confirm
that I had not murdered you
and that you are alive.

704
00:36:14,099 --> 00:36:16,634
No, I am allowed to
come out of this room.

705
00:36:16,636 --> 00:36:19,002
And our baby's safe.

706
00:36:19,004 --> 00:36:20,070
Okay, good.

707
00:36:20,072 --> 00:36:21,338
And he has a clean diaper.

708
00:36:21,340 --> 00:36:22,573
Oh, thank god.

709
00:36:22,575 --> 00:36:26,109
So we can rest assured
you are not a murderer.

710
00:36:26,111 --> 00:36:28,512
I am not a murderer.

711
00:36:28,514 --> 00:36:29,647
You're a writer.

712
00:36:29,649 --> 00:36:31,115
I am a writer.

713
00:36:31,117 --> 00:36:32,283
Okay.

714
00:36:32,285 --> 00:36:33,284
Glad we could
clear that up.

715
00:36:33,286 --> 00:36:34,785
Glad we could
clear that up.

716
00:36:34,787 --> 00:36:38,956
[narrator] so what would
happen if that red-flag
system did exist?

717
00:36:38,958 --> 00:36:42,326
If a dad like jerome
might someday have his
door knocked on

718
00:36:42,328 --> 00:36:45,562
Because his search
records became public?

719
00:36:50,568 --> 00:36:52,903
The consensus seems to be

720
00:36:52,905 --> 00:36:55,005
That the retention
of this kind of information

721
00:36:55,007 --> 00:36:57,474
Should be greater
than zero days.

722
00:36:57,476 --> 00:37:01,078
And the reason has to do with
police actions, terrorists,

723
00:37:01,080 --> 00:37:03,314
Patriot act, all those
sorts of things.

724
00:37:03,316 --> 00:37:05,516
Turns out that in this
environment,

725
00:37:05,518 --> 00:37:06,816
The digital environment,

726
00:37:06,818 --> 00:37:08,819
There's a loophole to
the 4th amendment,

727
00:37:08,821 --> 00:37:12,022
Which is, if a third party
collects a lot of this
information,

728
00:37:12,024 --> 00:37:14,725
The government doesn't have to
go through those same hoops.

729
00:37:14,727 --> 00:37:16,460
It's called the third party
doctrine.

730
00:37:16,462 --> 00:37:20,931
The third party doctrine means
that when you the consumer

731
00:37:20,933 --> 00:37:22,900
Share data with a bank,

732
00:37:22,902 --> 00:37:24,234
With an email provider,

733
00:37:24,236 --> 00:37:26,036
With a search engine,

734
00:37:26,038 --> 00:37:28,638
With any kind of technology
company,

735
00:37:28,640 --> 00:37:31,442
You have basically
given up

736
00:37:31,444 --> 00:37:35,345
What would have been your
4th amendment protections
over that data.

737
00:37:35,347 --> 00:37:38,248
For the government to get
information from a google
or a facebook,

738
00:37:38,250 --> 00:37:40,551
Is a lot easier than the
government doing it itself

739
00:37:40,553 --> 00:37:42,519
And putting a wiretap
on our phones.

740
00:37:42,521 --> 00:37:45,255
Large companies like
google and facebook

741
00:37:45,257 --> 00:37:48,859
Receive thousands of requests
a year from government agencies.

742
00:37:48,861 --> 00:37:52,062
Facebook has 25 employees
doing nothing but surveillance,

743
00:37:52,064 --> 00:37:55,733
And these companies
routinely receive requests,

744
00:37:55,735 --> 00:37:57,801
They process the requests.

745
00:37:57,803 --> 00:38:00,304
You may be surprised to hear
that secret searches of email

746
00:38:00,306 --> 00:38:02,306
By the government
seem to be commonplace.

747
00:38:02,308 --> 00:38:06,410
The law that governs
when the government

748
00:38:06,412 --> 00:38:08,679
Can get electronic
communications,

749
00:38:08,681 --> 00:38:12,015
Like emails and things
that are stored remotely,

750
00:38:12,017 --> 00:38:15,452
Was written in 1986, and could
have effects

751
00:38:15,454 --> 00:38:18,288
That allow the government to at
least claim

752
00:38:18,290 --> 00:38:21,392
That they should be able to get
location data without a warrant.

753
00:38:21,394 --> 00:38:23,527
Or at one point the
government was claiming

754
00:38:23,529 --> 00:38:27,464
That it doesn't need
a warrant to get emails
that you've opened.

755
00:38:34,339 --> 00:38:38,542
Well, in the spring of 2011,
the department of justice,

756
00:38:38,544 --> 00:38:39,943
And in particular the fbi,

757
00:38:39,945 --> 00:38:43,113
Made several requests to
internet companies as part

758
00:38:43,115 --> 00:38:47,017
Of an investigation relating
to individuals associated
with wikileaks.

759
00:38:47,019 --> 00:38:52,222
We released 400,000
classified documents.

760
00:38:52,224 --> 00:38:54,758
[narrator] for those of
you who don't know who
julian assange is,

761
00:38:54,760 --> 00:38:56,726
He started wikileaks.

762
00:38:56,728 --> 00:38:59,363
Now, in the past,
wikileaks has released
secret documents

763
00:38:59,365 --> 00:39:00,364
Related to the iraq war,

764
00:39:00,366 --> 00:39:03,000
Guantanamo bay,
and afghanistan.

765
00:39:03,002 --> 00:39:07,037
And that's, you know,
obviously a positive development

766
00:39:07,039 --> 00:39:10,574
For those of us who think
that information

767
00:39:10,576 --> 00:39:13,377
Should be more accessible
almost no matter what,

768
00:39:13,379 --> 00:39:15,179
And obviously is a
threatening development

769
00:39:15,181 --> 00:39:18,549
To those institutions, like
corporations in many cases,

770
00:39:18,551 --> 00:39:20,951
That depend on secrecy.

771
00:39:20,953 --> 00:39:24,555
I condemn the action
that wikileaks has taken.

772
00:39:24,557 --> 00:39:28,191
It puts at risk
our national security.

773
00:39:28,193 --> 00:39:31,562
Twitter received an order
that requested data

774
00:39:31,564 --> 00:39:33,163
Regarding certain twitter users.

775
00:39:33,165 --> 00:39:35,666
These were all users
that were related to

776
00:39:35,668 --> 00:39:38,401
The whistleblower website
wikileaks.

777
00:39:38,403 --> 00:39:40,003
However, it wasn't
just an order.

778
00:39:40,005 --> 00:39:43,106
It was actually a d-order
and it came with a gag order.

779
00:39:43,108 --> 00:39:46,610
It required that twitter
never speak publicly

780
00:39:46,612 --> 00:39:48,612
About the fact that they
had received this request.

781
00:39:48,614 --> 00:39:50,047
[reporter]
denouncing the move,

782
00:39:50,049 --> 00:39:53,050
Assange said he believes other
american internet companies

783
00:39:53,052 --> 00:39:54,918
Such as facebook and google

784
00:39:54,920 --> 00:39:57,621
May also have been ordered
to disclose information.

785
00:39:57,623 --> 00:40:01,458
Companies like amazon,
yahoo, dropbox,

786
00:40:01,460 --> 00:40:06,062
Even facebook,
will be capable

787
00:40:06,064 --> 00:40:09,766
Of handing data
to the government without
first informing users.

788
00:40:09,768 --> 00:40:13,003
Even if you think what the
people are doing is wrong,

789
00:40:13,005 --> 00:40:15,739
That's why
the first amendment exists.

790
00:40:15,741 --> 00:40:18,442
To protect unpopular people

791
00:40:18,444 --> 00:40:21,978
Engaging in
unpopular speech.

792
00:40:21,980 --> 00:40:23,347
[narrator]
but twitter fought back.

793
00:40:23,349 --> 00:40:25,148
They released the information
to the users,

794
00:40:25,150 --> 00:40:26,650
And let them know
ahead of time.

795
00:40:26,652 --> 00:40:29,586
And they were successful
in getting the gag order
overturned.

796
00:40:29,588 --> 00:40:32,755
Meanwhile, amazon, paypal,
mastercard, and visa-

797
00:40:32,757 --> 00:40:35,292
They all gave in to the pressure
regarding their users.

798
00:40:35,294 --> 00:40:38,695
You know,
a culture of loyalty
to not you,

799
00:40:38,697 --> 00:40:40,197
But a greater cause,

800
00:40:40,199 --> 00:40:42,466
Is important to be successful,
it seems like to me,

801
00:40:42,468 --> 00:40:45,335
And it's disloyal,
in this case, to the country.

802
00:40:45,337 --> 00:40:47,304
[narrator]
while president bush might
think it's disloyal,

803
00:40:47,306 --> 00:40:49,706
Thanks to twitter standing up
for the rights of activists

804
00:40:49,708 --> 00:40:51,074
Like julian assange,

805
00:40:51,076 --> 00:40:52,676
You can now be shown this.

806
00:40:52,678 --> 00:40:58,882
Today, we released
over 287 files

807
00:40:58,884 --> 00:41:05,489
Documenting the reality
of the international mass
surveillance industry,

808
00:41:05,491 --> 00:41:08,959
An industry which now
sells equipment

809
00:41:08,961 --> 00:41:11,995
To dictators and
democracies alike

810
00:41:11,997 --> 00:41:17,467
In order to intercept
entire populations.

811
00:41:17,469 --> 00:41:23,073
9/11 has provided a license
for european countries,

812
00:41:23,075 --> 00:41:25,976
For the United States,

813
00:41:25,978 --> 00:41:30,347
Australia, canada,
south africa, and others

814
00:41:30,349 --> 00:41:33,617
To develop spying systems
that affect all of us.

815
00:41:40,658 --> 00:41:42,326
[narrator]
the spy files show
the massive industry

816
00:41:42,328 --> 00:41:44,428
That surrounds selling
to the us government

817
00:41:44,430 --> 00:41:46,930
And governments
around the world.

818
00:41:46,932 --> 00:41:49,733
Instead of having something
called the total information
awareness act,

819
00:41:49,735 --> 00:41:51,768
With this big symbol
with the eye of the pyramid,

820
00:41:51,770 --> 00:41:53,070
Looking at everybody,

821
00:41:53,072 --> 00:41:55,539
Scanning the world
with its sinister laser beams,

822
00:41:55,541 --> 00:41:58,374
Instead they just have a bunch
of companies that exist

823
00:41:58,376 --> 00:42:00,677
That are providing bits
of those capabilities,

824
00:42:00,679 --> 00:42:02,746
And they're provided under
different contracts

825
00:42:02,748 --> 00:42:05,349
But you go up to the same
agency, the same people.

826
00:42:05,351 --> 00:42:08,584
One of the most popular
is called massive intercept,

827
00:42:08,586 --> 00:42:12,789
And basically what governments
are trying to do with this

828
00:42:12,791 --> 00:42:15,258
Is get as much information
as possible

829
00:42:15,260 --> 00:42:17,060
From our communications

830
00:42:17,062 --> 00:42:21,632
So they can analyze that
and detect patterns in that.

831
00:42:21,634 --> 00:42:23,300
It's interesting,
in your article,

832
00:42:23,302 --> 00:42:26,002
That you really talk
about the secretive nature
of the business.

833
00:42:26,004 --> 00:42:27,104
Right.

834
00:42:27,106 --> 00:42:28,271
They sell through trade shows

835
00:42:28,273 --> 00:42:29,906
Which are not open
to the media.

836
00:42:29,908 --> 00:42:32,208
[narrator]
but we actually went to
one of these conventions.

837
00:42:32,210 --> 00:42:33,476
It was pretty easy.

838
00:42:33,478 --> 00:42:36,713
We just called and asked
for a pass.

839
00:42:36,715 --> 00:42:39,082
So we talked
to the representative
from one of these companies,

840
00:42:39,084 --> 00:42:40,884
A firm called cellebrite.

841
00:42:40,886 --> 00:42:42,752
They were included
in the spy files.

842
00:42:42,754 --> 00:42:45,055
They're a company that sells
cell-phone extraction tools

843
00:42:45,057 --> 00:42:48,058
To every major government
sector in the us.

844
00:42:48,060 --> 00:42:49,660
So my name's christopher shin.

845
00:42:49,662 --> 00:42:52,729
I'm the vice president of
engineering for cellebrite usa.

846
00:42:52,731 --> 00:42:55,932
Today I'm presenting to you
the cellebrite u-fed system,

847
00:42:55,934 --> 00:42:57,367
To my right here.

848
00:42:57,369 --> 00:43:02,139
It is a device used to extract
countless information

849
00:43:02,141 --> 00:43:04,474
From mobile devices,
so text messages,

850
00:43:04,476 --> 00:43:07,144
Pictures, video, audio,
call logs, that kind of thing.

851
00:43:07,146 --> 00:43:11,148
It's used by agencies across
the United States and the world.

852
00:43:11,150 --> 00:43:14,451
Yeah, the iphone specifically
stores a lot of information;

853
00:43:14,453 --> 00:43:16,553
More than your normal handset.

854
00:43:16,555 --> 00:43:19,623
It really is a digital store
of your personal life,

855
00:43:19,625 --> 00:43:21,058
Your business life,

856
00:43:21,060 --> 00:43:23,493
And this is why
the field is actually,

857
00:43:23,495 --> 00:43:25,595
It's been growing
exponentially

858
00:43:25,597 --> 00:43:26,662
Over the last couple years.

859
00:43:26,664 --> 00:43:28,331
So as the devices
get more complex,

860
00:43:28,333 --> 00:43:29,699
They can hold
more information.

861
00:43:29,701 --> 00:43:32,636
This is one of the most
personal devices to you today,

862
00:43:32,638 --> 00:43:34,170
Even more than your laptop,
so...

863
00:43:34,172 --> 00:43:36,806
We think of ourselves as
basically a tool manufacturer.

864
00:43:36,808 --> 00:43:41,378
Just like, you know,
glock or beretta
is producing a firearm,

865
00:43:41,380 --> 00:43:44,715
We're producing a tool
that does a certain task,

866
00:43:44,717 --> 00:43:46,616
And we're marketing
that tool only towards--

867
00:43:46,618 --> 00:43:50,386
Just like you can't go out
and just buy a handgun
without credentials,

868
00:43:50,388 --> 00:43:52,789
We're not just
selling it to everybody.

869
00:43:52,791 --> 00:43:55,826
But could you conceivably
sell it, or are there
laws against it?

870
00:43:55,828 --> 00:43:59,463
There are no laws against
selling this to someone

871
00:43:59,465 --> 00:44:01,130
That's not in law enforcement
or government,

872
00:44:01,132 --> 00:44:02,199
Something like that.

873
00:44:02,201 --> 00:44:03,499
If someone was to dump
my phone tomorrow,

874
00:44:03,501 --> 00:44:06,136
They might get a good laugh
out of the content in it,

875
00:44:06,138 --> 00:44:07,437
But I don't think
I'd be put in jail.

876
00:44:07,439 --> 00:44:11,641
So I think that it really
depends on how you look at it.

877
00:44:11,643 --> 00:44:13,043
I mean,
there are privacy concerns,

878
00:44:13,045 --> 00:44:15,712
But I'm a little bit
more on, I guess,

879
00:44:15,714 --> 00:44:19,649
The liberal side
of my privacy being exposed.

880
00:44:19,651 --> 00:44:20,784
I mean,
other people, of course,

881
00:44:20,786 --> 00:44:21,885
That's a completely different--

882
00:44:21,887 --> 00:44:24,454
That's a completely
personal view.

883
00:44:24,456 --> 00:44:27,390
My phone itself, I mean--

884
00:44:27,392 --> 00:44:28,925
I actually take that back;

885
00:44:28,927 --> 00:44:31,161
I have a lot of work-related
information on my blackberry,

886
00:44:31,163 --> 00:44:33,764
So if this information
did get out,

887
00:44:33,766 --> 00:44:37,634
I probably
would be pretty concerned.

888
00:44:37,636 --> 00:44:40,737
The surveillance vendors
target two types of customers.

889
00:44:40,739 --> 00:44:42,672
They target governments
directly,

890
00:44:42,674 --> 00:44:46,042
And then they so target
internet service provirs

891
00:44:46,044 --> 00:44:48,245
And tecommunications carriers

892
00:44:48,247 --> 00:44:50,880
Who are tasked with
the responsibili

893
00:44:50,882 --> 00:44:52,649
Of spying on
their own customers.

894
00:44:52,651 --> 00:44:53,884
[narrator]
for ample,

895
00:44:53,886 --> 00:44:55,485
There was a little
piece of software

896
00:44:55,487 --> 00:44:57,854
That h been installed
on every phone in america.

897
00:44:57,856 --> 00:45:00,923
This software
was called carrier iq.

898
00:45:00,925 --> 00:45:02,692
And thankso a little video

899
00:45:02,694 --> 00:45:05,562
That a systems administrator
from connecticut
posted on youtube,

900
00:45:05,564 --> 00:45:07,697
The world now knows
that this software

901
00:45:07,699 --> 00:45:11,168
Had been monitoring
our every keystroke.

902
00:45:11,170 --> 00:45:16,205
[electronic voice]
five fifty-three,
and so on and so forth.

903
00:45:16,207 --> 00:45:18,141
[narrator]
according to carrier iq's
chief marketer,

904
00:45:18,143 --> 00:45:19,876
They're aware that his
information is sensitive,

905
00:45:19,878 --> 00:45:22,012
And call it a treasure trove.

906
00:45:22,014 --> 00:45:23,313
It became
big enough of a deal

907
00:45:23,315 --> 00:45:26,716
That al franken decided
to take this issue to congress.

908
00:45:26,718 --> 00:45:30,687
Mr. Director, millions
of americans have smart phones

909
00:45:30,689 --> 00:45:36,393
With preinstalled software
designed by a company
called carrier iq.

910
00:45:36,395 --> 00:45:38,295
Recent research has shown

911
00:45:38,297 --> 00:45:41,932
That it captures a broad range
of sensitive information.

912
00:45:41,934 --> 00:45:43,433
Let me start off by saying

913
00:45:43,435 --> 00:45:46,436
We have neither sought
nor obtained any information
from carrier iq

914
00:45:46,438 --> 00:45:49,138
In any one of our
investigations.

915
00:45:49,140 --> 00:45:50,706
Not directly from carrier,

916
00:45:50,708 --> 00:45:54,110
But what about from
the wireless carriers?

917
00:45:54,112 --> 00:45:55,278
No, I don't believe so.

918
00:45:55,280 --> 00:45:57,914
If you're--
if you're specifying the use

919
00:45:57,916 --> 00:46:02,519
Of the carrier iq
software in--

920
00:46:02,521 --> 00:46:07,090
By a wireless carrier,
have we sought that?

921
00:46:07,092 --> 00:46:08,825
I do not know,

922
00:46:08,827 --> 00:46:11,962
And the information we seek
from wireless carriers
or what have you,

923
00:46:11,964 --> 00:46:15,264
And I'm not talking
about carrier iq,

924
00:46:15,266 --> 00:46:17,200
I'm talking about
wireless carriers.

925
00:46:17,202 --> 00:46:18,267
Right.

926
00:46:18,269 --> 00:46:19,502
We may obtain information

927
00:46:19,504 --> 00:46:23,707
That in some way carrier iq
may have been involved with.

928
00:46:23,709 --> 00:46:25,275
[narrator]
why would the fbi

929
00:46:25,277 --> 00:46:28,144
Need carrier iq to send them
all of this information?

930
00:46:28,146 --> 00:46:30,180
After all,
they could be using
any of these services

931
00:46:30,182 --> 00:46:32,649
That were included
in the spy files.

932
00:46:32,651 --> 00:46:34,217
Take this product,
for instance.

933
00:46:34,219 --> 00:46:37,220
Scan and target,
which claims that it can
search through the sms,

934
00:46:37,222 --> 00:46:40,523
The ims, twitter,
emails, facebook,
blogs and forums,

935
00:46:40,525 --> 00:46:44,561
All while analyzing huge volumes
of information in real time.

936
00:46:44,563 --> 00:46:46,796
Or finfisher,
which demonstrates how police

937
00:46:46,798 --> 00:46:48,298
Can infiltrate anyone's system

938
00:46:48,300 --> 00:46:49,466
Through a variety of videos

939
00:46:49,468 --> 00:46:52,035
That used to be available
on their website.

940
00:46:52,037 --> 00:46:53,303
They even show the agent

941
00:46:53,305 --> 00:46:57,006
Hacking into google
and facebook in their demo.

942
00:46:57,008 --> 00:46:59,342
Who has
this kind of equipment?

943
00:46:59,344 --> 00:47:01,077
Massive interception
equipment

944
00:47:01,079 --> 00:47:04,915
Is sold by surveillance
vendors around the world.

945
00:47:04,917 --> 00:47:08,919
It's really up for grabs
for anyone who wants it
and can pay the price.

946
00:47:08,921 --> 00:47:10,720
[narrator]
the finfisher system

947
00:47:10,722 --> 00:47:13,957
Was sold to egypt to monitor
people who opposed their leader.

948
00:47:13,959 --> 00:47:15,659
These are the actual documents.

949
00:47:15,661 --> 00:47:17,727
It even includes training
for two to four people

950
00:47:17,729 --> 00:47:20,931
For the low, low price
of about eleven grand.

951
00:47:20,933 --> 00:47:22,699
Or the hacking teams project,

952
00:47:22,701 --> 00:47:25,468
Which advertises that it
can track hundreds
of thousands of cell phones,

953
00:47:25,470 --> 00:47:27,103
All on one system.

954
00:47:27,105 --> 00:47:28,371
Or software like kapow,

955
00:47:28,373 --> 00:47:30,740
That analyzes
all social networks,

956
00:47:30,742 --> 00:47:31,975
With features
like the ability

957
00:47:31,977 --> 00:47:35,011
To search out key words
and phrases.

958
00:47:35,013 --> 00:47:36,579
Everything that happens
on facebook,

959
00:47:36,581 --> 00:47:38,848
And it shows the frequency
of conversations

960
00:47:38,850 --> 00:47:41,318
Between one person and another
and all that kind of thing.

961
00:47:41,320 --> 00:47:44,153
That allows for a lot
of profiling,

962
00:47:44,155 --> 00:47:45,855
It creates massive databases

963
00:47:45,857 --> 00:47:48,825
For law enforcement to exploit,
and often misread.

964
00:47:48,827 --> 00:47:51,561
[narrator]
with hundreds of companies
offering these services,

965
00:47:51,563 --> 00:47:54,364
Why would the fbi
need to use carrier iq?

966
00:47:54,366 --> 00:47:55,966
Everything coming
from a cell phone,

967
00:47:55,968 --> 00:47:59,169
Everything coming
from a computer,

968
00:47:59,171 --> 00:48:00,704
Anything that's going
over the internet,

969
00:48:00,706 --> 00:48:03,272
Out of the country, or even
internal within the country,

970
00:48:03,274 --> 00:48:05,208
Can be monitored using
this kind of equipment.

971
00:48:05,210 --> 00:48:09,112
If you look at news stories
now about what they call
"big data"--

972
00:48:09,114 --> 00:48:11,915
Big data is really looking up
the question

973
00:48:11,917 --> 00:48:15,085
Of how can government
and corporations

974
00:48:15,087 --> 00:48:20,289
Work with that data
in order to look for anomalies

975
00:48:20,291 --> 00:48:22,391
And predict when
you're gonna do something

976
00:48:22,393 --> 00:48:24,227
So they can stop you
from doing it?

977
00:48:24,229 --> 00:48:26,830
[narrator]
and the government isn't even
that secretive about it.

978
00:48:26,832 --> 00:48:28,898
If you visit
their business website,

979
00:48:28,900 --> 00:48:30,734
There's an application there
looking for developers

980
00:48:30,736 --> 00:48:34,004
To create better tools
for mass surveillance
for online activity.

981
00:48:34,006 --> 00:48:37,474
Examples for surveillance
include but are not limited to

982
00:48:37,476 --> 00:48:42,512
Fox news, cnn, msnbc,
twitter, facebook, etc.

983
00:48:42,514 --> 00:48:45,482
Which brings us back
to that word you'll find
in many user agreements.

984
00:48:45,484 --> 00:48:48,651
It's the word that
sent us down this whole path
in the first place.

985
00:48:48,653 --> 00:48:49,853
"prevent."

986
00:48:49,855 --> 00:48:51,621
So this might make you wonder:

987
00:48:51,623 --> 00:48:54,724
What potential threats
would all this surveillance
we agreed to

988
00:48:54,726 --> 00:49:06,770
Actually prevent?

989
00:49:06,772 --> 00:49:08,638
Basically,
January the third,

990
00:49:08,640 --> 00:49:10,540
20 days
before I go on holiday,

991
00:49:10,542 --> 00:49:13,443
I tweet,
"are you free this week
for a gossip / prep

992
00:49:13,445 --> 00:49:14,811
Before I go
destroy america?"

993
00:49:14,813 --> 00:49:16,613
Ended the tweet with a kiss,

994
00:49:16,615 --> 00:49:18,248
As threatening as that is.

995
00:49:18,250 --> 00:49:21,317
Um, 20 days later,
I get on a flight,

996
00:49:21,319 --> 00:49:24,220
Go to lax, we had a hotel
on hollywood boulevard,

997
00:49:24,222 --> 00:49:26,289
We were just going
to party around for a week,

998
00:49:26,291 --> 00:49:28,491
Just looking around,
just be tourists.

999
00:49:28,493 --> 00:49:31,227
Get off the plane, went through
the passport control,

1000
00:49:31,229 --> 00:49:32,595
Swiped my passport through
and they were like,

1001
00:49:32,597 --> 00:49:34,164
Can you come this way?
And I was like,

1002
00:49:34,166 --> 00:49:35,765
It's 'cause I've got an irish
passport, I thought maybe,

1003
00:49:35,767 --> 00:49:39,102
Irish people, it's like
stereotype, ira bombers.

1004
00:49:39,104 --> 00:49:41,438
So they went through my
suitcase, and I was like, ugh,

1005
00:49:41,440 --> 00:49:44,240
What are you doing,
and then when they pulled
me into the holding room,

1006
00:49:44,242 --> 00:49:47,343
I was questioned for
five hours about whether
I had a twitter account.

1007
00:49:47,345 --> 00:49:49,279
And it was like,
are you being serious?

1008
00:49:49,281 --> 00:49:51,014
Are you actually holding me
because of a tweet?

1009
00:49:51,016 --> 00:49:53,917
And they were like, 'what do
you mean by "destroy america?"'

1010
00:49:53,919 --> 00:49:57,921
And I was like, to party?
It means to go wild, get drunk?

1011
00:49:57,923 --> 00:50:00,023
Any moron that could read that
tweet

1012
00:50:00,025 --> 00:50:03,493
Could see what it's meant as,
like it ends with a kiss.

1013
00:50:03,495 --> 00:50:08,665
I'm sure, like, hitler
doesn't end his memoirs with
a kiss or whatever he did.

1014
00:50:08,667 --> 00:50:10,733
So then they moved us
to a holding room,

1015
00:50:10,735 --> 00:50:12,769
But then at midnight,
the staff changed over,

1016
00:50:12,771 --> 00:50:14,671
And they weren't aware of
what we were there for,

1017
00:50:14,673 --> 00:50:17,574
So they handcuffed us, stuck us
in the back of a police van,

1018
00:50:17,576 --> 00:50:21,344
And then took us to a downtown
prison detention center.

1019
00:50:22,946 --> 00:50:25,882
Innocent people shouldn't be
treated like absolute dirt,

1020
00:50:25,884 --> 00:50:29,419
And they were dragging us round,
pushing us into walls.

1021
00:50:29,421 --> 00:50:32,088
Sounds like
a horrible vacation.

1022
00:50:32,090 --> 00:50:33,656
Is the government
refunding you, at least?

1023
00:50:33,658 --> 00:50:35,324
No!

1024
00:50:35,326 --> 00:50:37,660
They won't comment
on what happened.

1025
00:50:37,662 --> 00:50:39,529
Well, if I'd put I was going
to paint the town red,

1026
00:50:39,531 --> 00:50:42,732
They'd have me down for graffiti
as well, wouldn't they?

1027
00:50:42,734 --> 00:50:46,970
When I go to other countries,
this is gonna show up that
I got refused from america,

1028
00:50:46,972 --> 00:50:49,739
So more than likely I'm now
gonna get dragged off at every
airport

1029
00:50:49,741 --> 00:50:52,041
And questioned about
what happened,

1030
00:50:52,043 --> 00:50:54,577
And then I'll have to explain
to them that it was a tweet.

1031
00:50:54,579 --> 00:50:59,983
I'm italian, irish, french,
portuguese, native american--

1032
00:50:59,985 --> 00:51:01,918
Plant-- I'm even like
one-eighteenth avatar.

1033
00:51:03,954 --> 00:51:05,455
<i>[narrator]
this is joe lipari.</i>

1034
00:51:05,457 --> 00:51:07,891
<i>Joe lipari had had a rough day
at the apple store.</i>

1035
00:51:07,893 --> 00:51:13,129
He had been forced to wait
in line for four hours
before finally leaving.

1036
00:51:13,131 --> 00:51:18,101
So I get home from the apple
store, still a little irritated,

1037
00:51:18,103 --> 00:51:20,436
<i>Smoke a little dope,
put on fight club,</i>

1038
00:51:20,438 --> 00:51:23,139
Just trying to relax,
go on facebook.

1039
00:51:23,141 --> 00:51:26,309
<i>[ed norton in fight club]
and this buttoned-down,
oxford-cloth psycho</i>

1040
00:51:26,311 --> 00:51:32,949
Might just snap and then
stalk from office to office
with an armalite ar-10--

1041
00:51:32,951 --> 00:51:36,452
"semi-automatic weapon,"
and I said the same thing,
but except the apple store.

1042
00:51:36,454 --> 00:51:38,021
[norton]
pumping round after round...

1043
00:51:38,023 --> 00:51:43,059
And, you know, basically word
for word except for where.

1044
00:51:43,061 --> 00:51:45,461
Hangin' out on facebook,
getting' ready to go
to yoga class,

1045
00:51:45,463 --> 00:51:49,866
And there's a
"shave and a haircut, two bits"
knock on my door.

1046
00:51:49,868 --> 00:51:53,002
<i>So I was like, hey,
maybe somebody's here
to watch fight club with me.</i>

1047
00:51:53,004 --> 00:51:54,470
[chuckles]

1048
00:51:54,472 --> 00:51:59,142
Open it up, boom, nypd
s.W.A.T., bulletproof vests on,

1049
00:51:59,144 --> 00:52:02,979
Their guns drawn, and
they tear the place apart,

1050
00:52:02,981 --> 00:52:04,514
You know, they really
go through everything.

1051
00:52:04,516 --> 00:52:09,318
The one cop finds
the box that has all my,
like, military awards.

1052
00:52:09,320 --> 00:52:11,920
He comes bringing it down,
he says oh, you were
in the military?

1053
00:52:11,922 --> 00:52:15,291
And we start talking
army talk, he sees that
I speak the language.

1054
00:52:15,293 --> 00:52:19,462
And that's when
he asks me, do you know
what an armalite ar-10 is?

1055
00:52:19,464 --> 00:52:21,731
And I was like, that's
why you're here, guys?

1056
00:52:21,733 --> 00:52:25,535
You're here because I made
a bad joke on facebook?

1057
00:52:25,537 --> 00:52:28,905
Like I, you know--
it blew my mind.

1058
00:52:28,907 --> 00:52:34,510
It's the ultimate buzzkill,
really, your facebook page
brought s.W.A.T. To your house.

1059
00:52:34,512 --> 00:52:36,980
They told me not to like,
you know, go far from new york

1060
00:52:36,982 --> 00:52:39,649
'cause I'll be needed for all
these court cases for a year.

1061
00:52:39,651 --> 00:52:46,422
They claim one of my
facebook friends called 911.

1062
00:52:46,424 --> 00:52:49,559
Which is another thing
I think is bogus.

1063
00:52:49,561 --> 00:52:53,429
So I asked for the 911 tape,
which they keep on file.

1064
00:52:53,431 --> 00:52:55,665
They have to.
And it's my right,

1065
00:52:55,667 --> 00:52:58,501
It's my stuff.
They have to give me
my mug shots if I want.

1066
00:52:58,503 --> 00:53:03,439
So they come back and say,
oh, turns out it wasn't
someone who called 911,

1067
00:53:03,441 --> 00:53:05,708
It was someone that just
walked into the police station,

1068
00:53:05,710 --> 00:53:07,844
And that's something
"we don't keep a record of."

1069
00:53:07,846 --> 00:53:11,314
And how'd you get my address?
I'd lived there
for like 10 days.

1070
00:53:11,316 --> 00:53:14,517
You know, like, I didn't
update my mailing address yet,

1071
00:53:14,519 --> 00:53:16,552
Like, all my banking
stuff is still going
to my old apartment--

1072
00:53:16,554 --> 00:53:21,758
There was nothing
saying I lived there except
for a verbal agreement.

1073
00:53:23,694 --> 00:53:25,495
[boy] 'three minutes after
being done with my lunch,

1074
00:53:25,497 --> 00:53:28,331
I was told to go up
to the office,

1075
00:53:28,333 --> 00:53:33,002
And then I was sat down inside
the vice principal's office,

1076
00:53:33,004 --> 00:53:37,907
And I wasn't told what
was going on until maybe
ten minutes later.

1077
00:53:37,909 --> 00:53:40,710
[woman] my phone rings, and
I look at it and it was
the number to his school,

1078
00:53:40,712 --> 00:53:44,147
And I answer it, and it's
the school security guard--

1079
00:53:44,149 --> 00:53:47,650
Just giving me a fyi, you know,
for your information,

1080
00:53:47,652 --> 00:53:50,253
Just to give you a heads-up,
the secret service is here

1081
00:53:50,255 --> 00:53:52,322
With the tacoma police
department, and they have vito

1082
00:53:52,324 --> 00:53:53,589
And they're talking to him.

1083
00:53:53,591 --> 00:53:58,227
[vito] a man walked in,
in a suit and glasses,

1084
00:53:58,229 --> 00:54:03,866
And he said that he was
part of the secret service,

1085
00:54:03,868 --> 00:54:06,769
And he told me it was
because of a post that I made,

1086
00:54:06,771 --> 00:54:10,072
And it indicated as a threat
toward the president.

1087
00:54:10,074 --> 00:54:13,876
[narrator] yes, a seventh-grade
boy was visited by our fbi

1088
00:54:13,878 --> 00:54:16,713
Because of a red flag that
came up in their spy system.

1089
00:54:16,715 --> 00:54:19,649
I was saying how osama's dead,

1090
00:54:19,651 --> 00:54:21,451
And for obama to be careful,

1091
00:54:21,453 --> 00:54:24,253
Because there might
be suicide bombers.

1092
00:54:24,255 --> 00:54:26,622
[narrator] it didn't consider
his age, or that his comment

1093
00:54:26,624 --> 00:54:29,992
About obama needing to
watch out was one of concern.

1094
00:54:29,994 --> 00:54:32,995
The machine simply determined
that based on a series of words,

1095
00:54:32,997 --> 00:54:34,931
Vito was a potential threat.

1096
00:54:43,807 --> 00:54:50,747
Pre-crime, the belief in this
potential breach of the peace,

1097
00:54:50,749 --> 00:54:53,549
Their belief that
you might cause a crime.

1098
00:54:53,551 --> 00:54:58,654
There's those pre-crime
arrests in minority report.

1099
00:54:58,656 --> 00:55:00,390
[tom cruise in minority report]
mr. Marks, by mandate of

1100
00:55:00,392 --> 00:55:02,392
The district of columbia
pre-crime division,

1101
00:55:02,394 --> 00:55:05,194
I'm placing you under arrest
for the future murder
of sarah marks,

1102
00:55:05,196 --> 00:55:07,563
Due to take place today,
April 22nd,

1103
00:55:07,565 --> 00:55:09,232
At zero eight hundred hours
and four minutes.

1104
00:55:09,234 --> 00:55:10,533
No! I didn't do anything.

1105
00:55:10,535 --> 00:55:12,435
This arrest happened
on the royal wedding day

1106
00:55:12,437 --> 00:55:16,239
When I attended a zombie
flash mob wedding picnic--

1107
00:55:16,241 --> 00:55:18,608
- Great.
- And myself
and four other zombies

1108
00:55:18,610 --> 00:55:23,212
Were arrested preemptively for
a potential breach of the peace.

1109
00:55:23,214 --> 00:55:25,715
Even if you dress up
as a zombie, it seems to me

1110
00:55:25,717 --> 00:55:28,851
That the crime isn't
really committed until
you've eaten some brains.

1111
00:55:28,853 --> 00:55:32,822
Yeah. To be fair,
we did have some brain cake.
So there's that.

1112
00:55:32,824 --> 00:55:36,359
How did they know that
you were going to be dressing
up as a zombie this day?

1113
00:55:36,361 --> 00:55:38,594
Could it have been emails,
or anything really?

1114
00:55:38,596 --> 00:55:40,563
It could have been.
It's hard to know, yeah.

1115
00:55:40,565 --> 00:55:43,466
- I think that's
the toughest thing, right?
- That's the scary thing, yeah.

1116
00:55:43,468 --> 00:55:47,503
The indication that
they were monitoring
private social networks

1117
00:55:47,505 --> 00:55:51,207
Came in the way they were
reacting to certain things and
asking about certain things.

1118
00:55:51,209 --> 00:55:54,210
So they were asking about
maggots, and they were asking
about climbing gear,

1119
00:55:54,212 --> 00:55:56,846
Which they must have heard
about through some exchanges
on the internet.

1120
00:55:56,848 --> 00:55:59,582
Neither of which was true.
Nobody had maggots
or climbing gear.

1121
00:55:59,584 --> 00:56:03,886
And not something that was
itself posting a hazard to the
royal wedding celebrations;

1122
00:56:03,888 --> 00:56:06,522
We were nowhere near
the royal wedding celebrations,

1123
00:56:06,524 --> 00:56:09,425
And we had no plan of going near
the royal wedding celebrations.

1124
00:56:09,427 --> 00:56:13,362
Anything that wasn't part
of the official, ostentatious,

1125
00:56:13,364 --> 00:56:16,299
Joyous, expensive,
celebrations

1126
00:56:16,301 --> 00:56:19,068
Of this wedding
of two strangers

1127
00:56:19,070 --> 00:56:22,004
Was prevented from
happening,

1128
00:56:22,006 --> 00:56:24,339
And that seems
deeply disturbing.

1129
00:56:24,341 --> 00:56:26,342
You can see that surveillance
measures are being used

1130
00:56:26,344 --> 00:56:29,745
To silence protests
before they even happen.

1131
00:56:29,747 --> 00:56:33,416
And this was of course
the royal wedding.

1132
00:56:33,418 --> 00:56:38,187
We'd all helped pay for
the royal wedding, it wasn't
just a private wedding.

1133
00:56:38,189 --> 00:56:40,490
[from tv]
you're arresting
a professor of anthropology

1134
00:56:40,492 --> 00:56:42,325
That runs
a street theater group.

1135
00:56:42,327 --> 00:56:46,195
One o' kings, one o' kings,
one o' kings--

1136
00:56:46,197 --> 00:56:47,697
We couldn't believe
this was happening.

1137
00:56:47,699 --> 00:56:50,866
It was just--
we werso obviously
a street-theater troupe.

1138
00:56:50,868 --> 00:56:53,769
Some of us hadctually
gotten costume on, you know?

1139
00:56:53,771 --> 00:56:57,707
So we were locked away in
lewishamolice station
for 25 hours.

1140
00:56:57,709 --> 00:57:01,344
Once the whole wedding was
safely over, we were let out.

1141
00:57:01,346 --> 00:57:04,380
For the first time, as far
as I'm aware in this untry,

1142
00:57:04,382 --> 00:57:07,483
A number of us-- something
like fifty of us---

1143
00:57:07,485 --> 00:57:11,387
Were arrested, and
in most cases incarcerated

1144
00:57:11,389 --> 00:57:14,790
For thinking about protest,

1145
00:57:14,792 --> 00:57:16,993
For thinking
about, in this case,
some street theater.

1146
00:57:21,865 --> 00:57:24,534
A lot of-- a lot of life
is based upon trust.

1147
00:57:24,536 --> 00:57:29,805
I mean, if you have
a conversation with
your inner circle

1148
00:57:29,807 --> 00:57:34,610
On a key strategic decision
that is vital to your company

1149
00:57:34,612 --> 00:57:37,947
And you read about it in
the newspaper before the
decision is implemented,

1150
00:57:37,949 --> 00:57:40,216
In other words, you get
preempted from acting

1151
00:57:40,218 --> 00:57:42,518
Because somebody inside
your company has talked,

1152
00:57:42,520 --> 00:57:43,819
You're not gonna like it,
and it'll hurt.

1153
00:57:45,455 --> 00:57:47,790
[narrator] the activists
didn't need to commit any crime.

1154
00:57:47,792 --> 00:57:51,060
They just needed to text and
to email, and to call each other

1155
00:57:51,062 --> 00:57:52,895
About potentially protesting.

1156
00:57:52,897 --> 00:57:57,900
But I think that
the answer is not to
take away the capacity of

1157
00:57:57,902 --> 00:58:01,203
Looking at the public actions
of citizens and keeping
a record of them.

1158
00:58:01,205 --> 00:58:06,842
The solution is to make
sure that we elect
better governments.

1159
00:58:14,818 --> 00:58:17,719
Well, I know this argument,

1160
00:58:17,721 --> 00:58:21,958
And it is not very new.

1161
00:58:21,960 --> 00:58:24,126
It's old-fashioned, saying,

1162
00:58:24,128 --> 00:58:30,499
"we are complying with rules
and so what happens?"

1163
00:58:30,501 --> 00:58:34,637
Between leading my--
leading the sinful life
I would like to lead,

1164
00:58:34,639 --> 00:58:36,973
And hoping that governments
will protect my privacy,

1165
00:58:36,975 --> 00:58:39,274
Or, assuming that no one's
going to protect my privacy

1166
00:58:39,276 --> 00:58:43,195
And leading a less sinful life,
I'll go with the latter.

1167
00:58:43,197 --> 00:58:46,449
It's simply just the odds
of success seem higher to me.

1168
00:58:46,451 --> 00:58:49,552
I congratulate the people who
say they have nothing to hide.

1169
00:58:49,554 --> 00:58:51,253
I don't believe them,

1170
00:58:51,255 --> 00:58:54,457
And I also say they're probably
hiding something from someone.
We all do.

1171
00:58:54,459 --> 00:58:57,393
You have nothing
to hide till you do.

1172
00:58:57,395 --> 00:58:59,595
And you are not necessarily
going to know

1173
00:58:59,597 --> 00:59:00,896
What you have to hide or not.

1174
00:59:08,472 --> 00:59:10,473
[narrator] you might
remember the case of milly,

1175
00:59:10,475 --> 00:59:14,543
A teenaged girl in britain
who disappeared in 2002.

1176
00:59:14,545 --> 00:59:17,380
[announcer]
police in surrey say they're
growing increasingly concerned

1177
00:59:17,382 --> 00:59:19,882
About the safety of
a thirteen-year-old girl

1178
00:59:19,884 --> 00:59:23,285
Who hasn't been seen
since Thursday afternoon.

1179
00:59:23,287 --> 00:59:26,222
[narrator] before the police
found her body, her parents
were holding on to hopes

1180
00:59:26,224 --> 00:59:28,858
That she might still be alive.

1181
00:59:28,860 --> 00:59:33,829
I'd say if someone has taken
milly and is holding her,

1182
00:59:33,831 --> 00:59:37,600
Then please, please,
give her back to us.

1183
00:59:37,602 --> 00:59:39,334
[narrator]
why is that, you might ask?

1184
00:59:39,336 --> 00:59:42,038
Well, because according
to phone records,

1185
00:59:42,040 --> 00:59:44,774
Milly had checked
and deleted her voicemail.

1186
00:59:44,776 --> 00:59:48,577
We were sitting
downstairs in reception
and I rang her phone.

1187
00:59:48,579 --> 00:59:51,781
- Yes.
- And it clicked through
onto her voicemail,

1188
00:59:51,783 --> 00:59:53,549
- So I heard her voice.
- Yes.

1189
00:59:53,551 --> 00:59:55,151
And I was-- it was just like,

1190
00:59:55,153 --> 00:59:58,254
I jumped-- she's picked up
her voicemails, bob!
She's alive!

1191
00:59:58,256 --> 01:00:01,257
And I was just--
it was then, really.

1192
01:00:01,259 --> 01:00:04,160
[narrator]
as it turned out, members of
rupert murdoch's corporation

1193
01:00:04,162 --> 01:00:05,961
Had been hacking
into milly's phone,

1194
01:00:05,963 --> 01:00:09,932
Trying to be the first
to reveal details of
this national news story.

1195
01:00:09,934 --> 01:00:16,138
I think this is the watershed
moment, when finally
the public start to see,

1196
01:00:16,140 --> 01:00:21,410
And feel above all, just
how low and how disgusting

1197
01:00:21,412 --> 01:00:23,945
This particular newspaper's
methods were.

1198
01:00:23,947 --> 01:00:26,515
This was
a murdered schoolgirl,

1199
01:00:26,517 --> 01:00:31,953
And the thought that
a very tight-knit circle

1200
01:00:31,955 --> 01:00:34,056
Of very senior politicians

1201
01:00:34,058 --> 01:00:38,327
Linked up very closely,
intimately, with the police

1202
01:00:38,329 --> 01:00:41,864
And with the media mogul
rupert murdoch.

1203
01:00:44,067 --> 01:00:48,303
[newscaster] for 30 years,
as british prime ministers came
and most certainly went,

1204
01:00:48,305 --> 01:00:54,744
A constant character in their
worlds was rupert murdoch.
The billionaire media mogul--

1205
01:00:54,746 --> 01:00:57,946
[narrator]
for years, celebrities,
and individuals like milly,

1206
01:00:57,948 --> 01:01:00,449
Had the voicemails they thought
were hidden and private

1207
01:01:00,451 --> 01:01:05,053
Accessed by rupert murdoch's
corporation, at the expense
of people like milly's parents.

1208
01:01:05,055 --> 01:01:08,624
And it took nearly
a decade to expose the misuse
of this highly personal data.

1209
01:01:16,799 --> 01:01:20,402
Transparency, which, you know,
bonds us together and gives us
all so many friends

1210
01:01:20,404 --> 01:01:24,573
That we didn't know before,
but all these friends
that are connected,

1211
01:01:24,575 --> 01:01:30,713
Gives the state an absolutely
unparalleled in the history of
humanity

1212
01:01:30,715 --> 01:01:37,286
Ability to know what's going on
in its citizens, to find out
who the dissenters are.

1213
01:01:37,288 --> 01:01:42,491
The government is making
whistle-blowing a crime.

1214
01:01:42,493 --> 01:01:46,028
They are making
dissent a crime.

1215
01:01:46,030 --> 01:01:50,699
Especially when it embarrasses
the government and calls
the government to account.

1216
01:01:50,701 --> 01:01:52,968
If sources are gonna get
discovered,

1217
01:01:52,970 --> 01:01:56,605
And if whistleblowers cannot
securely and anonymously provide

1218
01:01:56,607 --> 01:01:58,507
That information to journalists,

1219
01:01:58,509 --> 01:02:02,878
We as a society won't know
when our rights are being
silently violated.

1220
01:02:15,559 --> 01:02:18,627
Of course, the president has
defended his administration

1221
01:02:18,629 --> 01:02:20,429
The only way he knows how.

1222
01:02:20,431 --> 01:02:25,734
If we can root out folks
who have leaked, they
will suffer consequences.

1223
01:02:26,736 --> 01:02:28,938
[audience laughing]

1224
01:02:37,113 --> 01:02:41,283
You look at a technical
perspective, the technologies
of maintaining privacy

1225
01:02:41,285 --> 01:02:44,753
Are actually running ahead of
the technologies that break it.

1226
01:02:44,755 --> 01:02:46,188
For example, encryption,

1227
01:02:46,190 --> 01:02:49,792
Which can maintain your privacy,
is running ahead of decryption.

1228
01:02:49,794 --> 01:02:54,096
[narrator] but what if there
was a way to store information
until it could be decrypted?

1229
01:02:54,098 --> 01:02:58,133
U.S. Intelligence officials
will soon be allowed to keep
information on u.S. Citizens

1230
01:02:58,135 --> 01:03:03,939
Much longer than they used to,
even if those citizens have
no known ties to terrorism.

1231
01:03:03,941 --> 01:03:07,843
Under new rules,
the government can store data
it gathers for five years.

1232
01:03:07,845 --> 01:03:10,412
That's up from the current
limit of six months.

1233
01:03:10,414 --> 01:03:16,785
General alexander,
if dick cheney were
elected president

1234
01:03:16,787 --> 01:03:21,023
And wanted to detain and
incessantly waterboard

1235
01:03:21,025 --> 01:03:23,225
Every american who sent
an email

1236
01:03:23,227 --> 01:03:27,496
Making fun of his
well-known hunting mishaps,

1237
01:03:27,498 --> 01:03:34,236
What I'd like to know is,
does the nsa have the
technological capacity

1238
01:03:34,238 --> 01:03:37,640
To identify those
cheney-bashers

1239
01:03:37,642 --> 01:03:40,976
Based upon the content
of their emails?

1240
01:03:40,978 --> 01:03:45,180
The-- in the United States,
we would have to go through

1241
01:03:45,182 --> 01:03:47,983
An fbi process, a warrant,

1242
01:03:47,985 --> 01:03:51,320
To get that and serve it to
somebody to actually get it.

1243
01:03:51,322 --> 01:03:52,988
But you do have the capability
of doing that.

1244
01:03:52,990 --> 01:03:54,990
Not in the United States.

1245
01:03:54,992 --> 01:03:59,028
There are new questions
about the national security
agency's massive spy center

1246
01:03:59,030 --> 01:04:01,997
Under construction
in the desert of utah.

1247
01:04:01,999 --> 01:04:06,201
Once finished, it'll be
five times the size of
the u.S. Capitol building.

1248
01:04:06,203 --> 01:04:08,370
The nsa is not allowed
to spy on americans,

1249
01:04:08,372 --> 01:04:12,007
But now a whistleblower
has come forward, saying that
the agency is doing it anyway.

1250
01:04:12,009 --> 01:04:16,912
This massive agency that's
collecting a tremendous amount
of information every day

1251
01:04:16,914 --> 01:04:21,483
By satellites and tapping of
cell phones and data links

1252
01:04:21,485 --> 01:04:23,686
On your computer or
email links and so forth.

1253
01:04:23,688 --> 01:04:27,188
And then it has to store
it someplace,

1254
01:04:27,190 --> 01:04:29,291
And that's why
they built bluffdale.

1255
01:04:29,293 --> 01:04:32,127
It's gonna cost
two billion dollars.

1256
01:04:32,129 --> 01:04:36,198
It's being built in this area
on a military base

1257
01:04:36,200 --> 01:04:39,902
Outside of salt lake city
in bluffdale.

1258
01:04:39,904 --> 01:04:43,739
As I said, they had to actually
extend the boundary of the town

1259
01:04:43,741 --> 01:04:46,508
So it would fit into it.

1260
01:04:46,510 --> 01:04:49,211
And the whole purpose
of this is the centerpiece

1261
01:04:49,213 --> 01:04:53,115
Of this massive
eavesdropping complex,

1262
01:04:53,117 --> 01:04:56,051
This network that was
created after 9/11.

1263
01:04:58,321 --> 01:05:02,157
The reality of
information technology is
it progresses exponentially.

1264
01:05:02,159 --> 01:05:04,259
Only information technology.

1265
01:05:04,261 --> 01:05:06,962
Exponential growth
starts out very slow,

1266
01:05:06,964 --> 01:05:09,898
Looks like nothing's
happening, you're doubling
tiny little numbers,

1267
01:05:09,900 --> 01:05:14,169
And suddenly, it takes off,
and we've seen that with
paradigm after paradigm,

1268
01:05:14,171 --> 01:05:17,773
Like social networks
in recent times.

1269
01:05:17,775 --> 01:05:23,112
[narrator] in 1984, to store one
gigabyte of data cost $85,000.

1270
01:05:23,114 --> 01:05:26,915
By 2012,
it cost about five cents.

1271
01:05:26,917 --> 01:05:30,419
In the city of chungking,
there are about 500,000 cameras.

1272
01:05:30,421 --> 01:05:35,523
In 2012, the cost of permanently
recording a high-resolution
feed was $300 million.

1273
01:05:35,525 --> 01:05:39,194
By the year 2020, the projected
cost is less than $3 million.

1274
01:05:39,196 --> 01:05:42,798
[man] the u.K. Being
one of the cultures
that's introduced cameras

1275
01:05:42,800 --> 01:05:45,868
Most ubiquitously
and most quickly,

1276
01:05:45,870 --> 01:05:48,137
So far the population
seems fine with it.

1277
01:05:48,139 --> 01:05:56,812
If they weren't,
they know who to call.

1278
01:05:56,814 --> 01:06:02,551
All of which feed into
this control center housed
in a secret location.

1279
01:06:02,553 --> 01:06:05,988
And I can call up, in real time,

1280
01:06:05,990 --> 01:06:09,491
All instances where
a camera caught someone
wearing a red shirt.

1281
01:06:09,493 --> 01:06:15,763
This is the shape and
the size of a potentially
suspicious unattended package.

1282
01:06:15,765 --> 01:06:19,134
Many police departments set to
use controversial new devices

1283
01:06:19,136 --> 01:06:21,870
Capable of scanning
people's faces,

1284
01:06:21,872 --> 01:06:24,940
Then checking that information
against a criminal database.

1285
01:06:24,942 --> 01:06:27,576
When we're at war, when
you're protecting your society

1286
01:06:27,578 --> 01:06:31,013
Against people who want
to come in and kill civilians,

1287
01:06:31,015 --> 01:06:34,182
You have to be able
to defend what we're doing.

1288
01:06:34,184 --> 01:06:36,784
You have to be able
to defend our way of life,

1289
01:06:36,786 --> 01:06:40,255
And you have to put these
powers into somebody's hands.

1290
01:06:40,257 --> 01:06:42,658
[narrator] according to
the brookings institution,

1291
01:06:42,660 --> 01:06:46,161
This kind of pervasive
monitoring will provide what
amounts to a time machine,

1292
01:06:46,163 --> 01:06:49,998
Allowing authoritarian
governments to perform
retrospective surveillance.

1293
01:06:50,000 --> 01:06:52,668
For example, if
an anti-regime demonstrator

1294
01:06:52,670 --> 01:06:55,838
Previously unknown to
security services is arrested,

1295
01:06:55,840 --> 01:06:57,673
It will be possible
to go back in time

1296
01:06:57,675 --> 01:06:59,942
To scrutinize the demonstrator's
phone conversations,

1297
01:06:59,944 --> 01:07:02,544
Automobile travels, and
the people he or she met

1298
01:07:02,546 --> 01:07:05,214
In the months and even years
leading up to the arrest.

1299
01:07:08,051 --> 01:07:11,686
[chris soghoian]
the government is using the
existence of terms of service

1300
01:07:11,688 --> 01:07:14,656
To justify the surveillance
state that we now live in.

1301
01:07:14,658 --> 01:07:18,293
The messages are free
to use, and most importantly,
they're encrypted,

1302
01:07:18,295 --> 01:07:21,830
So the police can't
actually get in there
to decrypt what happened.

1303
01:07:21,832 --> 01:07:25,767
So that's prompted calls to
shut down the entire network.

1304
01:07:25,769 --> 01:07:29,505
[narrator]
it's easy to justify using these
technologies to stop a riot.

1305
01:07:29,507 --> 01:07:32,741
But shouldn't we be
concerned when the government
is able to read our emails,

1306
01:07:32,743 --> 01:07:35,009
Text messages, phone calls,
search history...

1307
01:07:35,011 --> 01:07:37,779
To track our movements and
limit our free speech?

1308
01:07:37,781 --> 01:07:40,282
What crime did that
seventh-grade boy really commit?

1309
01:07:40,284 --> 01:07:43,118
Is having zombies at
a royal wedding really so bad?

1310
01:07:43,120 --> 01:07:45,420
What about milly's parents?

1311
01:07:45,422 --> 01:07:48,790
And what happens when
these technologies are used
to watch peaceful protesters,

1312
01:07:48,792 --> 01:07:53,528
Like all of the people
that occupy wall street,
or the tea party folks?

1313
01:07:53,530 --> 01:07:55,998
What happens if the government
doesn't like tents being set up?

1314
01:07:56,000 --> 01:07:59,501
[yelling, screaming]

1315
01:08:04,773 --> 01:08:08,944
Despite all of this,
it was starting
to seem like, so what?

1316
01:08:08,946 --> 01:08:11,780
So what if
the government can acquire
all of this information?

1317
01:08:11,782 --> 01:08:14,917
Maybe it's good they
can keep the peace when
riots are happening.

1318
01:08:14,919 --> 01:08:17,419
And besides, maybe
it was already too late.

1319
01:08:33,570 --> 01:08:36,438
I mean, it's certainly dying.

1320
01:08:36,440 --> 01:08:38,373
Whether or not it--

1321
01:08:40,910 --> 01:08:43,045
For privacy to--

1322
01:08:43,047 --> 01:08:44,913
I mean, privacy's
going to remain dead

1323
01:08:44,915 --> 01:08:48,250
Unless there's a really
fundamental shift in...

1324
01:08:48,252 --> 01:08:50,852
The dynamics by which
that's decided, by which I mean,

1325
01:08:50,854 --> 01:08:56,357
The only really effective
response is to monitor and
to change the behavior,

1326
01:08:56,359 --> 01:08:59,061
The tendencies of the
intelligence industry

1327
01:08:59,063 --> 01:09:03,031
And law enforcement and
all that, and even companies.

1328
01:09:03,033 --> 01:09:04,966
And that's very, very unlikely.

1329
01:09:04,968 --> 01:09:09,971
I don't know exactly
who the 'us' is, but
I'm very critical of us.

1330
01:09:09,973 --> 01:09:11,673
I think that this is an area

1331
01:09:11,675 --> 01:09:14,543
In which we have allowed
ourselves to be smitten,

1332
01:09:14,545 --> 01:09:18,580
We want this technology
to grow and grow,

1333
01:09:18,582 --> 01:09:23,552
And we don't want anything
to rain on our parade.

1334
01:09:23,554 --> 01:09:30,025
And we have woken up
to the privacy concerns...

1335
01:09:30,027 --> 01:09:33,061
In my view,
at least four years too late.

1336
01:09:33,063 --> 01:09:35,597
I mean, is privacy dead?

1337
01:09:35,599 --> 01:09:38,100
Yeah, without question.

1338
01:09:38,102 --> 01:09:40,769
Without question, yeah,
it's dead.

1339
01:09:40,771 --> 01:09:44,205
It's safe to work
under the assumption
that nothing's private.

1340
01:09:44,207 --> 01:09:47,876
You know,
anything that's been
digitized is not private.

1341
01:09:47,878 --> 01:09:51,580
And that is terrifying.

1342
01:09:51,582 --> 01:09:53,782
When this becomes
the size of a blood cell,

1343
01:09:53,784 --> 01:09:56,018
And I can just
send them into my brain

1344
01:09:56,020 --> 01:09:57,519
And my body
through the bloodstream,

1345
01:09:57,521 --> 01:09:59,888
This'll become
quite ubiquitous,

1346
01:09:59,890 --> 01:10:01,523
And it really will be
part of who we are.

1347
01:10:01,525 --> 01:10:02,924
People say, well, okay,

1348
01:10:02,926 --> 01:10:06,094
That's gonna be a real
threshold to move beyond,

1349
01:10:06,096 --> 01:10:07,128
But I don't think so.

1350
01:10:07,130 --> 01:10:08,730
It's a very smooth continuum

1351
01:10:08,732 --> 01:10:11,633
From, you know,
when I was a student

1352
01:10:11,635 --> 01:10:14,202
And I had to take my bicycle
to get to the computer

1353
01:10:14,204 --> 01:10:18,774
To having it in my pocket
to having it in my body.

1354
01:10:18,776 --> 01:10:20,342
It's a convenient
place to put it;

1355
01:10:20,344 --> 01:10:22,344
I won't lose it that way.

1356
01:10:24,414 --> 01:10:26,214
But they say if you put
a frog in a pot of water

1357
01:10:26,216 --> 01:10:28,249
And slowly turn up the heat,

1358
01:10:28,251 --> 01:10:32,454
The frog'll just die,
because it doesn't realize
it's boiling.

1359
01:10:32,456 --> 01:10:36,825
And I think that,
like anything else,

1360
01:10:36,827 --> 01:10:39,828
I think we're opting in
a centimeter at a time,

1361
01:10:39,830 --> 01:10:43,264
And, you know, pretty soon
you' prerey far down the road,

1362
01:10:43,266 --> 01:10:48,170
You look behind you
and you sort of wonder
how you got where you were.

1363
01:10:48,172 --> 01:10:50,906
I think that's true.

1364
01:10:50,908 --> 01:10:54,576
It's just completely
out of control.

1365
01:10:54,578 --> 01:10:58,747
I mean, it's just--
sky's the limit, you know.

1366
01:10:58,749 --> 01:11:01,950
They know everything
about us now.

1367
01:11:01,952 --> 01:11:05,120
It takes someone--
it takes someone
who is in charge of laws

1368
01:11:05,122 --> 01:11:06,755
Having what is being done
to american citizens

1369
01:11:06,757 --> 01:11:08,857
Done to their email account
or to their facebook profile.

1370
01:11:08,859 --> 01:11:11,093
Right, if it's personal,
they're gonna pay attention
to it.

1371
01:11:11,095 --> 01:11:15,063
All of these powerful
institutions,

1372
01:11:15,065 --> 01:11:19,901
They're not subject
to the same invasions of privacy
as the rest of us are.

1373
01:11:19,903 --> 01:11:21,803
Eric schmidt,
the ceo of google, once said,

1374
01:11:21,805 --> 01:11:24,806
"if you have something that
you don't want anyone to know,

1375
01:11:24,808 --> 01:11:27,209
Maybe you shouldn't
be doing it in the first place."

1376
01:11:27,211 --> 01:11:30,879
Then he got very angry
when cnet,

1377
01:11:30,881 --> 01:11:34,416
Which is owned by cbs,
published a picture
of his house.

1378
01:11:34,418 --> 01:11:36,251
[mouse clicking]

1379
01:11:41,691 --> 01:11:44,693
When you ask google
about "do not track,"

1380
01:11:44,695 --> 01:11:48,397
They claim, "we have to
understand how to define that

1381
01:11:48,399 --> 01:11:50,632
Before we can implement
any technology."

1382
01:11:50,634 --> 01:11:52,100
"do not track's" pretty simple.

1383
01:11:52,102 --> 01:11:55,270
It means we don't want
to be tracked.

1384
01:11:55,272 --> 01:11:57,505
The only reason google
doesn't understand it

1385
01:11:57,507 --> 01:11:59,908
Is because google
doesn't want to implement it.

1386
01:12:25,234 --> 01:12:29,070
Unless someone comes
and makes it

1387
01:12:29,072 --> 01:12:34,609
No longer practical for them to
engage in that kind of activity,

1388
01:12:34,611 --> 01:12:37,679
Pressure is put upon ceos
of the companies,

1389
01:12:37,681 --> 01:12:39,714
They're going
to engage in it.

1390
01:12:50,025 --> 01:12:53,962
[mouse clicks]

1391
01:12:53,964 --> 01:12:56,231
We're going by the facebook
campus right now.

1392
01:12:56,233 --> 01:13:01,236
Really have no idea
what to expect.

1393
01:13:01,238 --> 01:13:03,839
Have not had breakfast.
Um...

1394
01:13:10,146 --> 01:13:12,214
Zuckerberg.

1395
01:13:12,216 --> 01:13:14,816
He'll know that I checked in
here, too, so that's good.

1396
01:13:14,818 --> 01:13:17,486
He knows that I'm
right next to his house.

1397
01:13:17,488 --> 01:13:21,089
Let's see, we have a--here's
the exact quote from mark.

1398
01:13:21,091 --> 01:13:26,094
So: "having two identities
for yourself is an example
of a lack of integrity."

1399
01:13:27,463 --> 01:13:30,966
Lack of integrity.

1400
01:13:30,968 --> 01:13:32,934
They just did a knock-up
on his door,

1401
01:13:32,936 --> 01:13:34,936
So it seems very likely
that we might get

1402
01:13:34,938 --> 01:13:37,806
A mark zuckerberg
sighting today.

1403
01:13:42,645 --> 01:13:46,615
I mean,
you might not be wrong,
vince, ben.

1404
01:13:46,617 --> 01:13:50,385
He might actually
have a tunnel.

1405
01:13:50,387 --> 01:13:53,488
There's some definite
motion in the yard.

1406
01:13:53,490 --> 01:13:56,658
Is it the dog?

1407
01:13:56,660 --> 01:13:59,027
- Here we go.
- That's him.

1408
01:14:06,335 --> 01:14:08,303
Mr. Zuckerberg?

1409
01:14:08,305 --> 01:14:09,938
Hey, I'm working on
a documentary.

1410
01:14:09,940 --> 01:14:12,607
Got a little blog here,

1411
01:14:12,609 --> 01:14:14,543
But wondering if I could just
ask you a couple questions?

1412
01:14:14,545 --> 01:14:16,711
No, I-- sorry.

1413
01:14:16,713 --> 01:14:17,712
Really?

1414
01:14:17,714 --> 01:14:19,114
I have to be at work.

1415
01:14:19,116 --> 01:14:21,683
Can I ask,
do you still think
privacy is dead?

1416
01:14:21,685 --> 01:14:25,387
What are your
real thoughts on privacy?

1417
01:14:25,389 --> 01:14:26,755
Are you guys recording?

1418
01:14:26,757 --> 01:14:29,591
Um-- we are.

1419
01:14:29,593 --> 01:14:30,825
Could you please not?

1420
01:14:30,827 --> 01:14:33,161
Um-- I can stop, yeah.

1421
01:14:33,163 --> 01:14:35,597
All right.

1422
01:14:35,599 --> 01:14:39,234
[narrator]
mark zuckerberg had asked me
to please not record him.

1423
01:14:39,236 --> 01:14:41,669
So we shut off
the main camera.

1424
01:14:41,671 --> 01:14:43,471
But since mark
doesn't seem to mind

1425
01:14:43,473 --> 01:14:49,477
Storing our data after
we think it's been deleted,
this only seemed fair.

1426
01:14:49,479 --> 01:14:50,879
Can you please not?

1427
01:14:50,881 --> 01:14:52,814
Um-- I can stop, yeah.

1428
01:14:52,816 --> 01:14:53,815
All right.

1429
01:14:53,817 --> 01:14:55,183
Can I come by
your front desk, though,

1430
01:14:55,185 --> 01:14:56,618
And ask about setting up
an interview?

1431
01:14:56,620 --> 01:14:58,486
Yeah, I mean--
we have a department

1432
01:14:58,488 --> 01:15:00,055
Where you can talk
to people about that.

1433
01:15:00,057 --> 01:15:02,190
Yeah, I know, I've tried
going through it a few times,

1434
01:15:02,192 --> 01:15:03,892
And I never hear back.

1435
01:15:03,894 --> 01:15:05,160
[narrator]
there's a major difference here.

1436
01:15:05,162 --> 01:15:07,996
Mark loosens up after he thinks
we've stopped recording.

1437
01:15:07,998 --> 01:15:11,299
And you see that?
That right there.

1438
01:15:11,301 --> 01:15:12,834
That's a smile.

1439
01:15:12,836 --> 01:15:15,470
Mark zuckerberg smiled at me.

1440
01:15:15,472 --> 01:15:16,538
And you know why?

1441
01:15:16,540 --> 01:15:18,373
Because he thought
I had stopped recording,

1442
01:15:18,375 --> 01:15:20,508
And he was relieved.

1443
01:15:20,510 --> 01:15:22,544
Imagine what a relief
it would be

1444
01:15:22,546 --> 01:15:25,080
If all of these companies
and the government

1445
01:15:25,082 --> 01:15:27,248
Stopped recording
everything we do.

1446
01:15:27,250 --> 01:15:30,051
If we could just make
a simple request to them--

1447
01:15:30,053 --> 01:15:33,054
Something that mark zuckerberg
knows how to ask for.

1448
01:15:33,056 --> 01:15:34,889
"can you please not?"

1449
01:15:34,891 --> 01:15:36,458
Can yopleau  not record us,

1450
01:15:36,460 --> 01:15:39,995
Monitor us,
and share our information,
unless we ask first?

1451
01:15:39,997 --> 01:15:42,764
We need terms and conditions
that are reasonable,

1452
01:15:42,766 --> 01:15:44,399
And we need privacy policies

1453
01:15:44,401 --> 01:15:47,068
That promote the most basic
principles of our democracy,

1454
01:15:47,070 --> 01:15:49,771
Rather than taking them away.

1455
01:15:49,773 --> 01:15:52,007
Or, as a young senator
once said,

1456
01:15:52,009 --> 01:15:53,675
Back before he became president:

1457
01:15:53,677 --> 01:15:55,309
We need to find a way forward

1458
01:15:55,311 --> 01:15:57,311
To make sure
that we can stop terrorists

1459
01:15:57,313 --> 01:16:02,217
While protecting privacy and
liberty of innocent americans.

1460
01:16:02,219 --> 01:16:03,818
We have to find a way
to give the president

1461
01:16:03,820 --> 01:16:05,820
The power he needs
to protect us,

1462
01:16:05,822 --> 01:16:09,190
While making sure
that he doesn't abuse
that power.

1463
01:16:09,192 --> 01:16:11,493
And that simple principle,

1464
01:16:11,495 --> 01:16:15,630
That there's somebody
watching the watcher,

1465
01:16:15,632 --> 01:16:20,602
Whether that's on an issue
of freedom of the press,

1466
01:16:20,604 --> 01:16:23,138
Or it's an issue
of warrantless wiretaps,

1467
01:16:23,140 --> 01:16:25,907
That simple principle
is one that we can't give up

1468
01:16:25,909 --> 01:16:27,842
And we don't have to give up.

1469
01:16:27,844 --> 01:16:31,746
[narrator]
well, mr. President,
we are watching.

1470
01:16:31,748 --> 01:16:38,186
And I guess we have to ask
ourselves one simple question:

1471
01:16:38,188 --> 01:16:40,488
Do we agree?

1472
01:16:56,205 --> 01:16:58,773
♫ cold feet and a tie

1473
01:16:58,775 --> 01:17:01,309
♫ rise to the occasion

1474
01:17:01,311 --> 01:17:03,644
♫ a million tiny flashlights

1475
01:17:03,646 --> 01:17:06,481
♫ I gotta turn it off

1476
01:17:06,483 --> 01:17:09,150
♫ cold feet and a tie

1477
01:17:09,152 --> 01:17:11,553
♫ rise to the occasion

1478
01:17:11,555 --> 01:17:13,922
♫ a million tiny flashlights

1479
01:17:13,924 --> 01:17:16,024
♫ I gotta turn it off

1480
01:17:16,026 --> 01:17:23,765
♫ for awhile,
I'll keep my place ¶

1481
01:17:26,569 --> 01:17:32,807
♫ but tonight,
I'll stay so late ¶

1482
01:17:32,809 --> 01:17:36,911
Washington is caught
in its very own episode
of spy versus spy.

1483
01:17:36,913 --> 01:17:38,513
The tactics once employed

1484
01:17:38,515 --> 01:17:40,749
By top intelligence-gathering
teams at the cia,

1485
01:17:40,751 --> 01:17:43,518
Sifting through ip addresses,
emails, and fake dropboxes,

1486
01:17:43,520 --> 01:17:47,655
Have now been turned against
the intelligence community's
top official.

1487
01:17:47,657 --> 01:17:50,125
♫ oh sleep for a while

1488
01:17:50,127 --> 01:17:53,228
♫ too much conversation

1489
01:17:53,230 --> 01:17:55,730
The fbi uncovered
evidence of an affair

1490
01:17:55,732 --> 01:17:58,500
Between petraeus and
his biographer paula broadwell.

1491
01:17:58,502 --> 01:18:00,502
That's right.

1492
01:18:00,504 --> 01:18:04,139
<i>Petraeus had an affair
with the author of his
fawning biography all in.</i>

1493
01:18:10,246 --> 01:18:12,547
These did not
implicate criminal activity;

1494
01:18:12,549 --> 01:18:15,016
These did not implicate
national security;

1495
01:18:15,018 --> 01:18:17,719
These were not a threat
to david petraeus the person,

1496
01:18:17,721 --> 01:18:19,254
Or to general petraeus,

1497
01:18:19,256 --> 01:18:23,024
The director of the central
intelligence agency.

1498
01:18:23,026 --> 01:18:25,760
Those are not my words;
those are the fbi's words.

1499
01:18:34,069 --> 01:18:35,936
But instead of actually
sending those emails,

1500
01:18:35,938 --> 01:18:38,206
In many cases
they wrote them as drafts

1501
01:18:38,208 --> 01:18:40,642
In a gmail account
they both had access to,

1502
01:18:40,644 --> 01:18:43,378
And that way they
could both log on
and check the draft folder,

1503
01:18:43,380 --> 01:18:45,980
Never having
to actually hit "send."

1504
01:18:45,982 --> 01:18:48,283
It's very embarrassing
for the obama administration

1505
01:18:48,285 --> 01:18:50,051
And for its
national security command.

1506
01:18:57,326 --> 01:18:58,893
It's troubling because

1507
01:18:58,895 --> 01:19:01,162
There are laws
that the fbi has to follow,

1508
01:19:01,164 --> 01:19:02,430
And he has the right

1509
01:19:02,432 --> 01:19:05,300
To be protected
from an unwarranted,

1510
01:19:05,302 --> 01:19:08,303
Unjustified investigation
by the fbi or anyone.

1511
01:19:08,305 --> 01:19:09,603
People don't really know
how they're being monitored,

1512
01:19:09,605 --> 01:19:11,105
And they think, hey,
if it's working,

1513
01:19:11,107 --> 01:19:13,207
If we keep stopping
another 9/11,

1514
01:19:13,209 --> 01:19:15,410
Then it's--then it's
quote "worth it."

1515
01:19:38,133 --> 01:19:44,005
The greatest fear that I have
regarding the outcome

1516
01:19:44,007 --> 01:19:47,842
For america of these disclosures
is that nothing will change.